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 This thesis examines the history of lexicography in the Greek tradition, 
beginning with Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE) and ending in the Byzantine period, 
principally focusing on De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, the epitome of a 
lexicon written by Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). While early Greek 
lexicographers opted for a more restrained and descriptive approach, Philo, intending 
to correct what he saw as common errors in the language, chose a highly prescriptive 
one, to the point of explicity criticizing Greek speakers from the previous centuries, 
such as Euripides, Callimachus, Menander, and even Homer. Despite his efforts, the 
Greek language continued to change, which raises a significant question about the 
purpose and function of lexicography, both in the Greek tradition and in general.  









Herennius Philo and the Dilemma of Lexicography 
Alec Smitten 
 
This thesis seeks to explore De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, the surviving 
epitome of the lexicon of Herennius Philo of Byblos (ca. 64-148 CE). By placing 
Philo in the timeline of Greek lexica, his prescriptive style and desire for absolute 
correctness in speech stands out among other lexicographers, and raises this question: 
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 It is no exaggeration to say that lexica, compilations of words and their 
meanings, belong to one of the oldest genres of scholarship. From as early as the third 
millennium BCE, we find the roots of what would ultimately become the idea of a 
lexicon. This tradition continued after Babylonians took over Sumeria and created 
correspondence lists of Akkadian words and Sumerian words. The Hittites too found 
the need to create systematic equivalences between words, producing tablets with 
Hittite, Sumerian, and Akkadian correspondences. As Rudolf Pfeiffer explains, “The 
keepers of the clay tablets who had to preserve the precious texts attached importance 
to the exact wording of the originals and tried to correct mistakes of the copyists; for 
that reason they even compiled ‘glossaries’ of a sort.”1 In other words, no pun 
intended, from some of our earliest recorded history, there has been great meaning 
attached to the words themselves which we use.  
 This need to understand words is not unique to the Near East. In the Vedic 
tradition, Nirukta, one of the Vedangas, that is, one of the “limbs” of scholarly study, 
is dedicated to etymology and the correct understanding of words, in particular 
archaic or infrequently occurring words, and can be tracked back as far as the end of 
the second millennium BCE.2 For reasons perhaps similar to the Sumerians’, those in 
India found a similar need to preserve and explain the meanings of words in texts to 
which they attached importance. It comes as no surprise, then, that the noun niruktiḥ 
connected to nirukta means “explanation of a word,” in other words, “definition.”
                                                 
1 Rudolf Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the End of the 
Hellenistic Age (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 18. 
2 Harold G. Coward and K. Kunjunni Raja, The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Volume 5 







 What is it that drives humanity towards compiling these lists of words and 
their meanings, often in multiple languages? And who is to say on what basis the 
created word-lists are complete or correct? 
 By the time of written literature in western civilization, there is clear evidence 
of interest in the meanings of words. Plato’s Cratylus is a dialogue deeply invested in 
the philosophical implications of words and their relationship to reality, and the orator 
Prodicus (ca. 465-395 BCE) was fascinated by the distinctions between synonyms and 
their applications in political oratory.3 The comedian Aristophanes (ca. 446-386 
BCE), too, explored the effect of words. In his play Clouds, for instance, Socrates 
presents Strepsiades with two chickens, and although he claims that Strepsiades 
wrongly identifies them both as chickens when one is actually “chicken-ness,” neither 
character questions the meaning of alektruon (“chicken”).4 Even Aristotle, in his 
Rhetoric and Poetics, could not escape the fascination of understanding words and 
what they mean.5  
By the time of the Alexandrian scholars in the fourth and third centuries, 
dictionaries as we would recognize them in the modern sense of the term began to 
appear. The desire to retain an understanding of the older words in classical Greek 
dialects and the necessity of understanding new words from recently Hellenized areas 
gave ample incentive for scholars to devise lexica. Yet even as they were trying to 
cement the Greek language and its rules into stable, lexical forms, the ground was 
shifting under their feet. Slowly but inexorably, the language of Homer was beginning 
to sound more arcane and archaic.  
                                                 
3  Plato, Euthyd. 277 e, Crat. 384 b. 
4  Aristophanes, Clouds, 660-666. 







 During the second century CE, “Atticist Lexica” first appear. These, unlike 
previous lexica such as that of Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE), were 
not only reference materials which explained the meanings of words but also didactic 
tools that explained “correct” usage. However, as quickly as they came about, this 
brand of lexicon disappeared. It was during this brief moment that Herennius Philo of 
Byblos lived. He was a Hellenized Phoenician scholar who, among other things, 
created a lexicon of this sort.  
The object of this research is to examine how lexica evolved in the Greek 
tradition and in particular to explain the important role Philo played in this brief 
period. His lexicon provides unique insight into the evolution of dictionaries, both in 
Greek and more broadly. Although Philo was unsuccessful in keeping classical 
dialects alive and tamping down solecisms ― which appears to have been his 
ambition ― what survives of his lexicon offers valuable insight into the mind-set of 
those who felt compelled to take on the task of systematically defining and 
differentiating words.  
 To this end, I will track the development of lexica in the Greek tradition, 
beginning in the first chapter with one of the earliest texts which we can confidently 
identify as a proper lexicon: the Ataktoi Glossai of the poet and scholar Philitas of 
Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE). In the wake of his work, lexicography started developing into 
a proper academic enterprise, embodied in particular by the Lexeis of Aristophanes of 
Byzantium. Lexicographers, however, were not the only scholars who spent time 
thinking about words, their meanings, and their uses. As Didymus Chalcenterus (ca. 
63 BCE – 10 CE) highlighted in his Homeric scholia, questions about word use 
permeated Alexandrian scholarship, in particular, the way they pertained to textual 







 The second chapter of this thesis entails a detailed analysis of De Diversis 
Verborum Significationibus, the lexicon of Herennius Philo as it is preserved in an 
epitome. The initial discussion will detail what information we have about his life and 
will attempt to place him in the larger scholarly timeline of ancient lexicography. This 
will require some attention to our only source for Philo’s text, Ammonius 
Grammaticus’ epitome of a presumably much larger work by Philo titled Peri 
Diaphorous Semasias (“On Differences of Meaning”). Unlike his previous works, this 
one is structured more like a modern dictionary, with some important differences. 
Here, Philo includes commentary regarding correct usage of the words he defines and, 
contrary to the practices of his predecessors, he shows a keen interest in making 
prescriptive claims about the use of words, even claiming predecessors and 
contemporaries misused them at times.  
Based on this, I will conclude that Philo intended, at least to some extent, to 
use lexica to keep the older, classical form of Greek “alive,” if not in a spoken form, 
at least among literate Greeks. Philo thus represents a last stand for those who wished 
to preserve classical Greek not as an antiquarian artifact preserved only for those 
interested in antiquity but as an important cultural attribute in this day.  
 This chapter will also examine the lexicon created by Ammonius 
Grammaticus during the fourth century, the same man who made the epitome of 
Philo’s original work. Although there are a great many correspondences between the 
epitome and Ammonius’ complete text, there are also significant and notable 
differences, chief among them that Ammonius largely avoids the prescriptive tone 
adopted by Philo, and in some cases even removes the admonitions he encountered in 







 The final chapter will offer a brief history of lexicography after Philo’s time. 
Looking at the broader context of Greek scholarship, we will see that Ammonius is 
something of an outlier. In the centuries following his lifetime, lexica trended away 
from his highly prescriptive style and instead drifted back toward gloss-making. Thus, 
despite his efforts to amend modern practice in his day, Herennius Philo was unable 
to halt the changes affecting the Greek language in the second century. In conclusion, 
this chapter will also attempt to reconcile this failure with the nature of lexicography 
itself and the ongoing struggle over the fundamental function of dictionaries. Should 





















CHAPTER 1: Lexicography before Philo 
 
1. Philitas of Cos (ca. 340-285 BCE)  
 Both modern and ancient scholars remember Philitas (or Philetas6) of Cos 
primarily as one of the earliest elegiac poets. Although his verse now survives only in 
fragments, he remained an important figure throughout most of antiquity. He is said to 
have been the teacher of other poets such as Hermesianax, Theocritus, and even 
Zenodotus, the eventual head of the Library of Alexandria.7 His poetry was itself 
deeply influential. Philitas’ influence on Callimachus was “pervasive,” and his reach 
extended even into the realm of Latin poetry, affecting Propertius and Vergil.8 
Quintilian ranked Philitas a close second to Callimachus.9  
 Today, we know little about him. He wrote a work called Demeter, which 
details the goddess’ search for her daughter Persephone in elegiac couplets, and 
another entitled Hermes, a hexameter poem describing Odysseus’ meeting with 
Aeolus and subsequent affair with Aeolus’ daughter. He also composed a collection 
of poems written in the style of epigrams and entitled Paignia. Philitas, however, was 
not solely a poet. In fact, his other scholarly pursuits seem to have been as well-
regarded as his poetry. 
 There is evidence suggesting that during his life and after, he was known for 
his study of lexicography. In the third century BCE, the comic poet Strato references 
Philitas in a scene of his play Phoenicides, in which a cook insists on using Homeric 
                                                 
6 Both spellings of the name are attested, but “Philitas” appears to be more frequently used. 
7 Konstantinos Spanoudakis, Philitas of Cos (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 29, 40. 
8 Ibid. 42, 59, 66. 







archaisms and forces his master “to take the books of Philitas and look up each word 
to find its meaning.”10  
 Although the name itself is problematical, of particular interest is his Ataktoi 
Glossai, the “Disorderly Glossary.” Although it survives only in fragments, we can 
gather some sense of the original document.11 For instance, the word kupellon occurs 
ten times in Homer and is regularly translated as “goblet;” in five of those instances it 
is paired with the epithet “golden.”12  According to Athenaeus, “Philitas says the 
Syracusans call the remnants of barley cake and bread left on the table kupella.”13 
From this, it is clear that something is amiss with the definition of kupellon, which is, 
no doubt, what attracted Philitas’ attention.  
 Another example is the word kreion, a hapax within Homer, which appears to 
have radically different meanings. The Homeric sense of this word is evident from 
Iliad 9.206, “So he spoke, and Patroclus trusted his dear comrade. Then he put down a 
large kreion into the light of the fire, and placed on it a sheep’s back and a fat 
goat’s.”14 Kreion here seems to refer to some sort of surface on which one can prepare 
meat, what we might term a “butcher block.” Philitas, however, provides a very 
different understanding, again as transmitted through Athenaeus: “kreion is a flat 
bread which Argives bring (as a gift) from the bride to the groom. It is baked on 
                                                 
10 Austin, Comicorum Graecorum Fragmenta in Papyris Reperta, Fragment 219, 42-44. 
11 Many such as Bachius and Pfeiffer have argued, as early as 1829 and as recently as 1968, that 
the adjective ataktos should be understood as meaning that the glossary itself was disorderly – 
inordinata – in the sense that it was not alphabetized. In all likelihood, this statement is correct, since 
properly alphabetized lexica did not become the norm until long after Philitas’ lifetime. In more recent 
years, there has been increasing resistance to this line of thinking from scholars who argue that the 
sense of ataktos does not refer to the organizational scheme of the glossary, but the words themselves. 
Upon examination of the fragments, it appears that Philitas is taking interest in words with variable and 
often inconsistent meanings, in other words, glossai which are themselves “disorderly.” It is, however, 
also plausible that both meanings of the word were intended. 
12 Il. 1.596, 3.248, 4.345, 9.670, 24, 305; Od. 1.142, 2.396, 4.58, 10.357, 20.253. 
13  Athenaeus 11.483a. 







charcoal, and the friends are invited to partake of it, and it is served with honey. So 
says Philitas in the Ataktoi.”15  
 Yet another example of an inconsistent Homeric word which caught Philitas’ 
attention and was quoted in Athenaeus is the word pella, “Cleitarchus in his Glosses 
says the Thessalians and the Aeolians call a milk pail pelleter, but a cup a pella. 
Philitas in his Ataktoi says a wine cup (kulix) is called a pella by the Boeotians.”16 
Once again, we see another instance of Philitas’ habit of identifying peculiar usages of 
otherwise attested words, with special attention to their provenance in the Greek-
speaking world. In fact, nearly half of the grammatical fragments of Philitas in 
Spanoudakis make mention of the fact that the word in question is used in a particular 
region or regional dialect.  
 His attraction to curious words went beyond simply their surface meaning and 
extended to even finer details. In Hesychius, a crucial Byzantine lexicographer, we 
find a gloss for the word amalla (“sheaf”), which is found in the Homeric compound 
amallodeteres and means, according to Bing, “those who bind the amalla.”17 The 
gloss reads, “amalla: sheaves, bundles of grain, a bunch, one hundred sheaves 
according to Istros; Philitas, though, says two hundred.”18 From this, the sense of 
amalla is clearly some sort of measure of grain. Philitas, however, felt the need to go 
out of his way to specify the precise number of sheaves. This suggests that Philitas’ 
work is not just an exercise in analyzing random, peculiar vocabulary. Instead, his 
objective appears to have been to collect unconventional words or their usages and 
incorporate them into his own verse. A natural consequence of this would have been 
                                                 
15  Athenaeus, 14.645d. 
16  Athenaeus, 9.495e. 
17 Peter Bing, “The Unruly Tongue: Philitas of Cos as Scholar and Poet,” Classical Philology 98, 
no. 4 (2003): 334, https://doi:10.1086/422370. 







the need to provide explanations of the meanings of such words. The scholarship 
underlying the Ataktoi Glossai, then, is not so much Philitas’ primary objective as an 
appropriate complement to his poetry.  
 In two fragments, the words discussed are explicitly cited in a poetic context. 
The first comes again from Hesychius and reads, “Skuzes: in Philitas, ‘I will keep you 
from your skuzes,’ instead of ‘your kapras.’”19 Since kapra is itself an uncommon 
word, Hesychius also provides a gloss of this term, saying it is synonymous with 
akolasia, “licentiousness.”20 This citation suggests that Hesychius is directly quoting 
Philitas, who, in turn, appears to be referencing an unknown comedy.21 The second 
comes from Strabo in the form of a comment on an elegiac couplet attributed to 
Philitas in another of his works, the Hermeneia: “A wretched, dirtied tunic, a tie of 
plaited black rushes (melankraninon) has been wrapped around a slender belly.”22 The 
word melankraninon is peculiar, and indeed Spanoudakis notes that compounds 
formed from melas- (“black” or “dark”) often create Homeric hapaxes, so it is 
unsurprising to see a poet with a fascination with uncommon words forming his own 
adjective modelled on a Homeric precedent.23 Unlike the previous examples, 
however, this is an instance of Philitas using his own neologism in a poetic context. 
 This couplet does not appear to be anomalous, since in the Demeter, Philitas 
demonstrates a pattern of using words which are either peculiar cult-epithets of 
deities, or words which are infrequently attested, even some hapaxes. Among the 
fragments of this work is an unusual epithet for Demeter, ompnia thesmophoros 
                                                 
19  Hesychius, sigma 1148. 
20   Hesychius, kappa 738. 
21  Spanoudakis, Philitas, 376. 
22  Strabo 3.5.1, II.83, Λευγαλέος δὲ χιτὼν πεπινωμένος, ἀμφὶ δ’ ἀραιὴ / ἰξὺς εἴλυται ῥάμμα 
μελαγκράνινον. This word is surely related to melankranis, the plant we call “black bog-rush.” 







(“nurturing law-giver”). Believed to come near the beginning of the work, ompnios is 
an Attic word of uncertain etymology which Philitas is said to have explained in his 
Ataktoi Glossai.24 Hesychius glosses ompnia as meaning trophe (“nurturing”) or 
karpophoros (“fruit-bearing”), clearly interpreting this epithet as a reference to the 
generative and agricultural qualities of the goddess.25 One plausible explanation for 
Philitas’ attraction to this word is its similarity to the more common and metrically 
identical epithet of Demeter, potnia (“revered”). In fact, the opening to Pindar’s Hymn 
to Persephone reads, Potnia Thesmophore.26 Spanoudakis goes so far as to say, 
“Philitas might have been the first to use a dialectal word denoting plenty as an 
epithet of Demeter.”27 The importance of this intersection between scholarship and 
poetry should not be overlooked. Philitas is augmenting his poetry by combining an 
obscure epithet for Demeter (ompnia) with one which has strong literary precedent 
(potnia). Then to ensure readers understand his choice, he includes an explanation for 
the obscure terminology in Ataktoi Glossai. 
 Philitas’ usage of regionalisms did not stop there. Elsewhere he describes 
Dionysus as bougenes (“bull-born”) which is, according to Spanoudakis, “a 
specifically Argive cult-epithet of Dionysus referring to his oxen-like appearance.”28 
Although this word is attested in two predecessors, Socrates of Argos and 
Empedocles, Philitas’ use of a rare and regionally specific cult-epithet is conspicuous 
in light of the other instances in which he pays special attention to words from 
different parts of the Greek-speaking world. This is echoed when Philitas uses 
aemma, related to hamma (“cord”), in reference to both Artemis and Apollo. This 
                                                 
24   Ibid. 142. 
25  Hesychius, omicron 828. 
26  Pindar, Hymn to Persephone, fr. 37. 
27  Spanoudakis, Philitas, 142. 







word seems to have originated in or around Crete, since Callimachus later uses it in 
the name of a Cretan archer, Echemmas, “he who has an aemma.”29  
 Furthermore, it appears that Philitas paid attention not only to the regional 
qualities of words, but their structure as well. As with the melas-compounds, there is 
evidence that Philitas had Homeric precedent in mind when pursuing lexical flare in 
his poetry. To this point, in another fragment of the Demeter, Philitas appears to have 
invented a new adjective, nechuton (“abundant”). As Spanoudakis explains, 
compound adjectives built from the prefix ne- find their basis in the Homeric corpus, 
and, although this prefix often acts with a negative force, Hellenistic Greeks later 
viewed it as having an intensifying force.30  
 Perhaps one of the most obscure Homericisms in Philitas comes in an epithet 
of Athena, dolichaoros, used only once elsewhere, and equivalent to the hapax 
dolichegches in Homer, meaning “with a long spear.”31 As opposed to the Homeric 
term, Philitas constructs his adjective from another term, one that rarely occurs 
outside of Homer, aor, which refers to any pointed weapon.32 Indeed, it appears 
Philitas not only employed adjective-forming prefixes and suffixes found in Homer, 
but also Homeric vocabulary in general. Thus, Philitas not only displays a proclivity 
for utilizing rare vocabulary in poetry, as he did with ompnia, but also for creating 
neologisms based on archaic linguistic formulae as with nechuton and melankraninon. 
In other words, he both gathered and invented exotic words which he used in his 
poems and later explicated in his lexicon.  
                                                 
29 Ibid. 193. 
30 Ibid. 154. 
31  Il. 21.155. 







 The picture of Philitas, then, is of a man who was both poet and lexicographer. 
Given that his verse fragments outnumber quotes from his lexicon, he seems to have 
been better remembered as the former; however, the quotation from Strato makes 
clear that Philitas’ lexicographic work had enough of an audience that a comic poet 
could joke about it. As Pfeiffer says, “his persona must somehow have been familiar 
to the Athenian audience.”33 In this way, Philitas occupies a fascinating moment in 
the history of lexicography, one in which the distinction between lexicography proper 
(the formal academic enterprise) and localized lexicography used as a tool for 
exploring language was beginning to form. While fascination with the meanings of 
words and glosses was certainly not a new phenomenon in his day, Philitas must be 
ranked among the first individuals to purposely couple his scholarly enterprises with 
his own poetry; as Strabo put it, poietes hama kai kritikos, “a poet and also a 
scholar.”34 
 In this regard, Philitas stands in marked contrast to later lexicographers like 
Aristophanes of Byzantium who were concerned with the precise meanings of Greek 
words in general. More to the point, there is little evidence to suggest that Philitas was 
interested in the full breadth of Greek vocabulary as Aristophanes was. Most notably, 
in strong contrast to later scholars, Philitas’ record provides no citation of sources. 
While it is clear he depended on Homer for both poetic inspiration as well as 
lexicographic content, Philitas does not show interest in classical authors such as 
Sophocles and Euripides, whose works would serve as standard fare feeding the 
engines of post-classical lexicography. 
 
                                                 
33 Pfeiffer, History, 91. 







2. Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257-180 BCE) 
 A century after Philitas, Aristophanes of Byzantium stands as a significant 
figure in the history of ancient Greek lexicography, and even more important in the 
history of Alexandrian scholarship in general. By all appearances, he was the first 
major scholar to develop a consistent methodology for establishing the pathe (“what 
befalls”) and etuma (“truth”) of words, that is, their physical transformations and 
etymological origins.35 His works now exist only as fragments preserved in a wide 
variety of sources. The majority appear to come from his Lexeis, a large glossary of 
Greek terms, both archaic and contemporaneous, drawn from across the Greek-
speaking world. Aristophanes’ lexical interest embraced a broad array of topics from 
post-classical vocabulary to kinship terms to terms for certain ages in the human life-
cycle.36 Unlike Philitas, Aristophanes seems to have been solely a scholar, or to 
borrow Strabo’s language, kritikos ou kai poietes, “a scholar and not a poet.” To judge 
from the citations of the more gloss-oriented sections of the Lexeis, he clearly paid 
close attention to the texts of Homer and classical authors such as Pindar and the 
tragedians whom he references by line number in order to support his interpretation of 
some term. Thus, not only does he follow the more rigorous methodology associated 
with modern lexicography, but he also establishes, perhaps unintentionally, what will 
become the standard lexicographic canon of Greek authors from which later scholars 
would often draw citations.  
                                                 
35 Varro, L. L. VI 2; Nauck p. 269. According to Dickey, he is also credited with being the first 
editor to arrange lyric poetry into verse and notate their metrical structure. He is also credited with the 
invention of theatrical hypotheses.  
36 Eleanor Dickey, Ancient Greek Scholarship: A Guide to Finding, Reading, and Understanding 
Scholia, Commenatries, Lexica, and Grammatical Treatises, from Their Beginnings to the Byzantine 







 Some entries are rather simple, summaries, no doubt, of Aristophanes’ original 
text, for instance, “kokkuzein: used instead of aidein (to sing),”37 or, “also kokkuzein is 
used of a chicken.”38 But many of the fragments are more robust, especially those 
which come from Eustathius, a twelfth-century bishop of Thessalonica whose 
commentary on Homer includes passages like this:  
And in regard to Cratinus, he says in 
his work, “They did not suffer the 
chicken to cry (kokkuzein),” which is to 
say aidein (to sing) as is appropriate 
for him. And for this reason, the 
kokkux is said to kokkuzein in Hesiod. 
And the adverb kokku is used in 
comedy. Even Sophocles suggests such 
a thought, and says in his work, “the 
kokkuboas bird.” Diphilos says more 
clearly in his work, “And indeed, by 
Zeus, in fact, an orthriokokkux (lit. 
“early-chicken”) among chickens just 
now sent me.” And Plato Comicus (the 
comic playwright) says clearly in his 
work, “Crying (kokkuzon) at you, the 
chicken calls you forth.”39 
 
This substantial fragment provides important insight into the lexical work of 
Aristophanes. Unlike Philitas who seems to have paid careful attention to words 
mainly for use in his own poetry, Aristophanes, the evidence suggests, examined 
words for their own sake. Furthermore, while Philitas was fascinated with obscure and 
unconventional words, Aristophanes instead seeks minor insights about mundane 
words, as, for instance, in another entry: “even Plato Comicus says ‘the prosopos 
(“face, countenance”; masculine) has spoken,’ instead of prosopon (neuter).”40 
Aristophanes seems to be commenting merely on the gender of the word which is 
                                                 
37  Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164. 
38  Parsinus gr. 1630. 
39 Eustathius, 1479,43 in delta 10 sine nom. auctoris. 







typically neuter, not masculine. While he shares with Philitas some interest in rare 
words like those based on kokku-, unlike his forebear he is clearly not justifying his 
use of such words in his own verse. Etymology has turned a corner.  
 Another notable quality of Aristophanes’ work is his citation of literary 
authors by name who have been drawn from a wide range of literature. For instance, 
another fragment reads, “And Aristophanes says that Sophocles says in relation to 
damalis (“heifer”), ‘earth-born boubalis (“heifer”),’ and Aeschylus says, ‘a new-born 
boubalis, eaten by a lion.’”41 This is not to say, however, that every fragment contains 
a citation of authorship. In some cases, what survives is more general: “The 
tragedians use prospolos (“servant”) for both men and women.”42 In others, all that 
exists is a brief reference to an author without even the citation of the work from 
which the word comes, as in this entry preserved by Eustathius: “The ancients clearly 
indicate that an agreed upon wage was called a latron (“payment”). For this reason, as 
is attested in the works of the grammarian Aristophanes, the one hired is called a 
latris (“hired servant”). But otherwise, he says, it has been used to refer to slaves.”43 
Despite the incomplete survival of his work, Aristophanes’ general practice as 
a lexicographer is easy to reconstruct. He relied upon the texts of his literary 
predecessors to validate his interpretations, often suggesting etymological connections 
between words which he saw as being related. In other words, he seems to have 
assessed the source texts he used without judging their correct use of Greek. In fact, 
of the fragments which contain clear citations of classical authors, the majority come 
from the canon newly formulated by Alexandrian scholars: Pindar, Euripides, 
                                                 
41 Sophocles fr. 792 R., Aeschylus fr. 330 N.2; Slater, p. 54. 
42  Parisinus suppl. Gr. 1164. 







Aristophanes Comicus, Sophocles, Aeschylus, and Homer, to name but a few.44 While 
these poets were to become the bedrock on which much ancient lexical scholarship 
rested, not everyone believed in the firmness of that foundation. Some looked to a 
higher authority for guidance about determining the nature of the Greek language.  
 
3. Didymus Chalcenterus (ca. 63 BCE – 10 CE) 
 Born a century or so after the death of Aristophanes of Byzantium, Didymus 
Chalcenterus (“Bronze-Guts”) was an Alexandrian scholar known for his prolific 
publication record. According to Quintilian, he wrote such a large number of texts on 
so many topics that, “when he opposed someone’s argument on the grounds that it 
was false, a book of his own which contained the same argument was brought 
forward.”45 Despite this brazen corpus, his work, like that of Aristophanes and 
Philitas, survives predominantly in fragments, found across a wide array of sources 
such as scholia for the Iliad and quotations preserved in Athenaeus, Eustathius, and 
Hesychius. More broadly, however, Didymus is representative of some of the ways in 
which lexicographical questions had influence across the various writings of 
Alexandrian scholars. 
 For instance, one fragment attributed to Didymus reads, “… written with an 
omicron and an upsilon pou, instead of pō (omega). Such are the opinions of 
Sosigenes and Aristophanes.”46 This is a reference to Iliad which reads “We know not 
anything at all (pou) about a common store of wealth.”47 There is obviously some 
                                                 
44 Although we now know that Homer greatly predates these authors, ancient scholars included 
Homer alongside them. 
45  Quintilian, 1.9.19. 
46  A.124; Didymus Chalcenterus and Moritz Schmidt, Didymi Chalcenteri grammatici 
Alexandrini fragmenta quae supersun omnia (Amersterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1964), 117. 







question about the reading of this line: should it read pou or pō? Since both words are 
metrically identical, the resolution of the matter falls to questions about the 
manuscripts and the meanings of the words.  
When written with an omega, this word is generally taken as the question 
word for “where” in the Doric dialect. Other uses include its function in compounds, 
for instance, oupō (“never”), and in questions which expect a negative answer. Here, 
however, Didymus’ concern seems to center around which reading makes better sense 
in the context. It is certainly plausible that there is also a question of transcription, 
since one can see how an omega and an omicron-upsilon pair could be confused for 
one another in a handwritten document, yet the invocation of scholarly opinion, 
particularly that of Aristophanes, as the deciding authority argues otherwise. 
Didymus’ reliance on preceding scholarship as to the proper interpretation of the text 
offers an important glimpse into the intellectual workings of Alexandria. How prior 
scholars saw the text affected the way later scholars thought about its correctness. 
Here, Didymus is choosing to defer to the opinions of earlier scholars since he thinks 
that they are more correct.   
Another scholium, this one on Iliad 10.431, is quite succinct, “hippodamoi: 
Aristarchus reads hippomachoi.”48 Modern editions of the Iliad prefer to read 
hippomachoi, so the full line reads “…and the Phrygians, fighters on horseback 
(hippomachoi), and the Maeonians, arrangers of chariots”.49 It is difficult to believe 
that the change between hippodamoi and hippomachoi was the result of manuscript 
error. Instead, it seems more plausible to suggest that this variation in reading is the 
result of a question over which Greek base is appropriate given the context of the 
                                                 
48  K.431; Schmidt, Fragmenta, 141. 







word, dam- (“conquer”) or mach- (“fight”). That is, should the reader have the sense 
that the Phrygians are known for their ability to tame horses, or for fighting 
predominantly on horseback? Although this is the type of question which 
lexicography could answer, Didymus’ attitude indicates that the fact that Aristarchus 
reads the line one way means it is the correct way. There is a certain prescriptive 
deference; what older scholars said was more correct and preferable.  
 Similarly, a scholion on Iliad 1.298 reads, “machēsomai: written so with an eta 
machēsomai, not with an epsilon-sigma machessomai,…”50. The full line reads “I will 
not fight (machēsomai) with my hands for the sake of the girl;” the question addressed 
in the scholium is over the future form of the verb machomai (“fight”).51 This is a 
much more difficult issue to explain by manuscript error alone since there is no clear 
explanation for the conflation of an eta and an epsilon sigma. A form of machomai 
featuring the stem machess- is not without precedent in Homer since there are attested 
certain forms of the aorist like this, for instance, machessasthai at Iliad 12.633; 
however, there is no such precedent for a future tense which uses that stem. Although 
the two forms are again metrically identical, the question centers on the “correct” 
formation of the future tense.  In this way, the scholia of Didymus show that there was 
a certain connection between textual problems and issues of proper language within 
Alexandrian scholarship. The readings suggested by older scholars like Aristophanes 
of Byzantium had authority for that reason and were preferred. Ideas about 
correctness had to do with the opinions of one’s predecessors and what they wrote 
about a matter.  
                                                 
50  A.298; Schmidt, Fragmenta, 118. 







 In conclusion, over a three-hundred year span, Greek lexicography changed 
considerably. From Philitas’ creation of a glossary to explain his peculiar vocabulary 
to Aristophanes’ eventual formalization of the process to Didymus’ invocation of 
lexical authorities in textual criticism, it took on the attributes of a more scientific 
process and became an important facet of intellectual endeavor. Although Didymus 
abided by the opinions of his predecessors and maintained their tendencies, change 
was on the horizon in the person of someone would challenge the conventions of that 










CHAPTER 2: Herennius Philo 
 
 Having now covered the early history of lexicography, we come to the primary 
item of interest in this thesis, Herennius Philo’s De Diversis Verborum 
Significationibus. In stark contrast to the previous lexicographers, whose interests 
were predominantly descriptive in some form or other, Philo takes a decidedly 
prescriptive interest by making assertions as to correct usage of words. To understand 
this change, it’s necessary to see the man in his proper historical context.  
 
1. Philo’s Life 
 The available biographical information on Philo’s life comes from the Suda, a 
tenth-century Byzantine lexicon and encyclopedia of the ancient world, which tells us 
that, “[Philo] was born around the time of Nero (54-68 CE), and lived for a long time; 
he himself says, when he was seventy-eight years old, the serving consul was 
Herennius Severus in Olympiad 220 (101-104 CE).” Because there was no consul 
named Herennius Severus in 101-104 BCE, the evidence here is suspect. Moreover, 
as Nikos Kokkinos among others points out, to be age seventy-eight in 101-104 CE, 
Philo could not have possibly been born in the reign of Nero. 52  Kokkinos then argues 
that the date should be emended to Olympiad 230 (141-144 CE) where there was, in 
fact, a T. Hoenius Severus who served as consul (141 CE), and whose name, 
Kokkinos argues, was assimilated to “Herennius” because Hoenius is an uncommon 
name. This argument is made all the more plausible by the broader association of 
                                                 
52 Nikos Kokkinos, “A note on the date of Philo of Byblus.” Classical Quarterly N.S. 62, no. 1 







Philo with his patron, one Herennius Severus, who is mentioned in the writings of 
Pliny the Younger.  
 Consequently, it seems more reasonable to assume that Philo was indeed born 
in or around 64 CE, and, if he did in fact live “for a long time,” perhaps into his mid-
80s, he died sometime around 148 CE.53 Other scholars have offered different theories 
for correcting the content of the Suda, but they all conclude that Philo was born in the 
second half of the first century and lived well into the second.54 
 Among other data about his life, we know that Philo produced numerous 
works besides De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, including Concerning the 
Reign of Hadrian, On Cities and their Famous Men, On the Acquisition and Choice of 
Books, and a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.55 
 
2. Philo’s De Diversis Verborum Significationibus  
 The history of this text is complex. As best we understand it, at some point 
around the beginning of the second century CE, Philo wrote a lexicon comparing 
different words. It was entitled Peri Diaphorous Semasias (“On Differences of 
Meaning”). This text is now lost. What survives is quoted in two different sources: the 
writings of Ammonius Grammaticus and those of a mysterious figure named 
“Ptolemaeus.” From Ammonius Grammaticus in the fourth century, we have two 
separate works: first, the one in question, De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, an 
                                                 
53 We know that Philo authored a work titled Concerning the Reign of Hadrian, which suggests 
that he likely lived beyond 138 CE, the year of Hadrian’s death. 
54 Vincenzo Palmieri proposes that the Olympiad should be read as Olympiad 226, though this 
would make Philo well over ninety years old when he could have written his biography of Hadrian, 
which makes the timeline implausible. Albert Baumgarten also refers to the possibility of reading eis 
makron (for a long time) as eis Markon (into the reign of Marcus Aurelius), however this is also 
implausible. 
55 Harold Attridge and Robert Oden, Philo of Byblos: The Phoenician History (Washington DC: 







epitome of Philo’s original lexicon, and second, Ammonius’ own work, De Adfinium 
Vocabulorum Differentia (“On the Differences of Similar Words”), which borrows 
heavily from Philo’s original, but with crucial differences in readings. Lastly, the 
lexicon attributed to “Ptolemaeus” is of uncertain date. Although its contents are 
similar to those of the epitome, they have been substantially pared down to the point 
that it pales in comparison to either of the works from Ammonius and has no real 
bearing on the text of Philo or this thesis.56  
 The critical point here is that what survives of Herennius Philo is seen 
primarily through the lens of Ammonius Grammaticus. As such, the window into 
Philo’s lexicon is limited; however, examination of the epitome alongside the text of 
Ammonius’ own work nevertheless reveals critical details about Philo’s attitude 
toward his discipline. 
 Palmieri’s critical edition of the text (1988) spans 1125 lines and 180 entries, 
running from alpha through phi. The table below shows the alphabetic distribution of 
the entries in the text: 
                                                 
56 Although it is not attributed to Philo by name, the similarity of its content indicates that it also 
used Philo’s archetype. There is, however, no known scholar of the name “Ptolemaeus” who could 
have authored this document, nor is this lexicon any more informative about the study of Philo than 
either of Ammonius’ works. It is not known when the first version of Ptolemaeus’ lexicon was written, 
but scholars agree, according to Dickey, that it was written after Ammonius Grammaticus. None of 
Ptolemaeus’ entries contain citations, and many are simply summaries of entries from the works of 
Ammonius. Consequently, the lexicon of Ptolemaeus does not have immediate bearing in discerning 
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Table 1: Distribution of Entries by Initial Letter 
 
 
It is important also to note that this distribution closely reflects the distribution of 
words in the Greek language itself. The following table shows that the number of 
entries per section in Philo’s text roughly corresponds to the proportion of pages spent 
on any given letter in the LSJ. 
                                                 
57 Due to what appears to be an issue with the manuscript, a number of entries beginning with 







Letter LSJ (pages/total) Philo (entries/total) 
Alpha 0.15 0.2 
Beta 0.015 0.016 
Gamma 0.015 0.02 
Delta 0.05 0.05 
Epsilon 0.045 0.161 
Zeta 0.0045 0.01 
Eta 0.01 0.022 
Theta 0.015 0.044 
Iota 0.015 0.027 
Kappa 0.09 0.033 
Lambda 0.025 0.0277 
Mu 0.045 0.038 
Nu 0.0125 0.0277 
Xi 0.003 0.005 
Omicron 0.045 0.072 
Pi 0.14 0.1 
Rho 0.0075 0.016 
Sigma 0.085 0.05 
Tau 0.045 0.044 
Upsilon 0.035 0.011 
Phi 0.025 0.005 
Chi 0.03 N/A 
Psi 0.006 N/A 
Omega 0.0065 N/A 
Standard Deviation 0.040 0.050 
Table 2: Comparison of the Distribution of Words in the LSJ vs. Philo 
 
 
The distribution of words in the Greek language compared to Philo’s range proves 
that he is looking broadly across the Greek vocabulary, which suggests that Philo is 







epitomator, Ammonius Grammaticus, is consulting a complete text of Philo, not 
selections based on the alphabet. As to the content of the work, it is clear that Philo is 
principally interested in distinguishing three “classes” of similar words: (1) one class 
that is based on meaning (false synonyms), (2) one class of words that look alike 
because of spelling and accentuation (homographs and near homographs), and (3) one 
class of words which share a common root or base but behave differently 
(grammatical variants).58  
 Entry 15 is an example of the first class. It explains the distinction between 
two verbs (referenced as infinitives) which relate to fear: 
Arrodein and orrodein are opposites of 
one another. For orrodein, written with 
an omicron, indicates “one who acts 
cautiously;”…. [For example,] Euripides 
introduces Perseus, saying “For I have 
never done wrong against those who 
have suffered terrible things, I myself 
fearing (orrodon) that I would suffer 
them.”... But arrodein is the opposite, 
this is not “to be cautious,” but “to aim at 
and to have taken courage.”59 
 
This example is typical of Philo. The entry begins with a clear statement of the words 
in question and proceeds to explain what one means as opposed to the other, often 
including some form of literary or scholarly reference, in this case, a quote from 
Euripides’ lost work Andromeda. Philo’s analysis of this first class of synonyms has 
the objective of clarifying the difference in meaning between two words. 
                                                 
58  See Appendix A for the complete translation of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus 
59  ἀρρωδεῖν καὶ ὀρρωδεῖν ἐναντίον ἀλλήλοις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀρρωδεῖν διὰ τοῦ ο σημαίνει τὸ 
εὐλαβεῖσθαι·…καὶ Εὐριπίδης τὸν Περσέα εἰσάγει λέγοντα (Andromed. fr. 130 n.2)·  ‘τὰς γὰρ 
συμφορὰς τῶν κακῶς πεπραγότων οὐπώποθ’ ὕβρισ’, αὐτὸς ὀρρωδῶν παθεῖν’. καὶ τὸ [μὲν] ὀρρωδεῖν 








 The second class of distinct words, those with similar spellings, falls into two 
types: homographs and near homographs. Entry 6 is a useful example of the latter:  
An anathēma differs from an 
anathĕma. For an anathēma, written 
with an eta, is “a thing both 
consecrated and set up in some divine 
place;” but an anathĕma, written with 
an epsilon, is “a thing having outrage 
and a curse.”60  
 
In this entry, the two words being compared vary by only one letter, but they have a 
significant difference in meaning. The first (anathēma) is a sort of votive offering, 
whereas the second (anathĕma) is something akin to a cursed amulet. This small 
distinction, however, would have posed a significant problem to Greek speakers in 
Philo’s day since Koine was in the process of losing distinctions in vowel 
gradations.61  
 Similarly, Philo also takes note of true homographs, words which are spelled 
the same way except for accent. Entry 7 reads:  
An ágroikos with a recessive accent 
and an agroîkos with a circumflex 
differ. For ágroikos with a recessive 
accent is “one without a share of 
knowledge;” agroîkos with a 
circumflex is “one passing his time in 
the field or an untamed man, equal to a 
wild beast.”62 
 
                                                 
60  ἀνάθημα ἀναθέματος διαφέρει. ἀνάθημα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν, τὸ διὰ τοῦ η γραφόμενον, τὸ 
ἀνιερούμενόν τε καὶ ἀνατιθέμενον ἱερῷ τινι τόπῳ· ἀνάθεμα δέ, διὰ τοῦ ε ἐκφερόμενον, τὸ ὕβρεως 
ἐχόμενον καὶ ἀναθεματισμοῦ. 
61 See Geoffrey Horrocks’ Greek: A History of the Language and its Speakers (Wiley-Blackwell, 
2010) for further details on linguistic changes in Koine. He goes on to discuss also how diacritical 
marks were being developed during Philo’s age to compensate for an increasing loss of tonal 
distinctions in spoken Greek.  
62  ἄγροικος βαρυτόνως καὶ ἀγροῖκος προπερισπωμένως διαφέρει. ἄγροικος μὲν βαρυτόνως ὁ 








Although these two words differ only in their intonation, they mean different things. 
In this case, the first is most likely a reference to a stock character in Greek comedy, 
whereas the second is a generic term for a farmer or any person deemed uncivilized. 
 In a third class of distinctions, Philo explores grammatical variations of words, 
such as those between active and medio-passive forms of the same verb. For instance, 
entry 17 reads: 
Amunesthai and amunein differ. For 
amunesthai is “to punish those who 
have done wrong,” whereas amunein is 
“to come to the aid of others.”63 
 
Both of these are infinitives formed from the same verb, yet a simple change of voice 
affects the meaning dramatically.   
 While only one of the four examples noted above (arrodein/orrodein, entry 
15) contains a citation drawn from the text of a classical author, this cannot be taken 
as any indication of Philo’s typical practice. Although they are not evenly distributed 
and quite a few entries have none, 128 include citations to a source. Philo sometimes 
embeds several citations within the same entry, and while he demonstrates a 
preference for citing classical authors, he also references a variety of Alexandrian 
scholars. Homer, for instance, is cited most often, thirty-three times, but the 
grammarian Tryphon is mentioned ten times, and Didymus Chalcenterus six. 
 This marks the first of a number of differences between Philo and earlier 
lexical authors. Although Philo does not fail to reference poets and playwrights such 
as Menander, his principal focus is fundamentally different from that of Philitas since 
there is no clear evidence that Philo is expecting his own lexical resource to serve as a 
                                                 
63  ἀμύνεσθαι καὶ ἀμύνειν διαφέρει. ἀμύνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ [τὸ] κολάζειν τοὺς προαδικήσαντας, 







supplement to other work he is doing. Furthermore, unlike Didymus, Philo shows no 
interest in expanding scholarly debate about the meanings of words since only five 
entries reference lexical disputes. If any, Aristophanes of Byzantium provides the 
clearest model for Philo, inasmuch as both share the goal of clarifying the exact 
meanings of words. Even so, Philo departs from all his known predecessors in one 
particular aspect: his commentary on correct usage. 
 
3. Philo’s Sources 
 There are sixteen instances in which Philo makes an explicit statement as to 
correct or incorrect usage, for instance, entry 14: 
Aûthis and aûthi without the sigma 
differ; for aûthis is “again” or “after 
these events,” but aûthi is also “the 
very thing here”. And so Callimachus 
says wrongly, “Right here (aûthi) I 
would strip this off, my weight,” 
instead of “after these events.” And in 
the Hecale, “For this, father, release 
me, and you would receive safety right 
here (aûthi),” instead of “again” 
(palin).64 
 
This criticism of Callimachus’ usage of authi is striking in light of previous lexical 
authors, none of whom take a vested interest in the actual usage of words in their 
context; rather, they use that context to elucidate the meanings of words.65 Philo, to 
the contrary, is not arguing that the text of Callimachus is wrong, but that Callimachus 
himself was wrong to have violated a rule of proper word usage. While that author 
                                                 
64  αὖθις καὶ αὖθι χωρὶς τοῦ σ διαφέρει. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖθις πάλιν ἢ μετὰ ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ αὖθι καὶ τὸ 
αὐτόθι. κακῶς οὖν Καλλίμαχός φησιν (fr. 1, 35 Pf.)· ‘αὖθι τόδ’ ἐκδύοιμι, τό μοι βάρος’, ἀντὶ τοῦ μετὰ 
ταῦτα. καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἑκάλῃ (fr. 238, 4 Pf.)· ‘τῷ <ῥα>, πᾶτερ, μεθίει με, σόον δέ κεν αὖθι δέχοιο’, ἀντὶ τοῦ 
πάλιν. 
65  While one may argue that Didymus made a number of prescriptive comments, those pertain to 







overall receives more admonition than the rest, Philo does not hesitate to critique 
others: Sophocles, Menander, Euripides, Sappho, and even Homer in one instance, 
although he immediately provides a justification for Homer’s solecism.66  
 This attitude colors the rest of the text, although the critique can be subtextual. 
Sometimes the objects of Philo’s criticism are vaguer, such as in entry 157, where he 
corrects “the rhetoricians”:  
Pus, pei, po, and touto differ among the 
Dorians. For pus is clearly an indicator 
of “toward a place,” pei indicates “in a 
place,” and po indicates “from a place,” 
as does touto. Consequently, those who 
doricise and say, “where (pei) are you 
going?” do so incorrectly, because pei 
indicates “in a place.” Sophron says, 
“for where (pei) is the asphalt?” and, 
“where (pei) are you, destruction?” 
instead of “where (pou) are you?” 
Whenever one intends to say “toward a 
place,” they say, for instance, “where 
(pus) are you going, into that corner?” 
as if to mean, “into the abyss.”67 
 
It is not clear precisely whom Philo is criticising, but this is obviously directed 
towards anyone at any time attempting to reproduce classical Doric Greek which to 
Philo is clearly substandard.  
 Elsewhere, Philo’s admonitions are directed broadly toward all those who 
speak Greek:  
18. Ateles and ateleston differ. For 
ateles is “something which has never 
been completed,” but ateleston is 
“something not able to be finished.” 
                                                 
66 Entries 108 and 164. 
67  πῦς καὶ πεῖ καὶ πῶ καὶ τουτῶ διαφέρει παρὰ Δωριεῦσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πῦς τὴν εἰς τόπον 
σημασίαν δηλοῖ· τὸ δὲ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ· τὸ δὲ πῶ τὴν ἐκ τόπου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τουτῶ (cf. Sophron. fr. 
85 K.). ὥσθ’ οἱ δωρίζοντες καὶ λέγοντες «πεῖ πορεύῃ;» ἁμαρτάνουσιν· τὸ γὰρ πεῖ τὴν ἐν τόπῳ δηλοῖ. 
Σώφρων (fr. 5 K.)· ‘πεῖ γὰρ <ἁ> ἄσφαλτος;’. (fr. 5 K.)· ‘πεῖ ἐσσί, λειοκόνιτε; —οὕτα’, ἀντὶ τοῦ «ποῦ 








And so those who conflate these speak 
incorrectly.68 
 
It is in light of these sorts of reprimands that the purpose of Philo’s work comes into 
clearer focus. Even though many of the entries are simply restatements of the 
definitions of words cited in pairs, seen in their larger context they predicate the 
proper use of Greek per Philo’s injunctions.  
 Of the 180 entries, 85 of them rely on the meaning of the words alone in order 
to differentiate them. Eighty, however, refer to literary or scholarly precedent in order 
to establish their difference, for instance:  
122. Nees (“transport ships”) differ 
from ploia (“barges”). Didymus says as 
such in his History that nees differ from 
ploia. For nees are rounded and used to 
transport troops. Aristotle says in his 
Justification of Wars, “During that time, 
after the Tarentines had been sent down 
to the war against the barbarians, 
Alexander the Molossian sailed away 
with fifteen nees, and many ploia 
carrying horses and infantry.”69 
 
Based on this passage, not only should one understand that they are different words 
but also that a naus is a different type of vessel from a ploion. Since classical authors, 
in this case Aristotle, use these terms interchangeably, and even if the Greek speakers 
around Philo’s time conflated them, it is obvious that Philo believes people still ought 
to respect the difference between the two words and what they mean. More than that, 
he clearly understands them as different not just because of any variation in the ships’ 
                                                 
68  ἀτελὲς καὶ ἀτέλε<σ>τον διαφέρει. ἀτελὲς μὲν γ[ὰρ] τὸ μήπω τετελεσμένον, ἀτέλεστον δὲ τὸ 
ἀδύνατον τελεσθῆναι. οἱ οὖν ἐναλλάσσοντες ταῦτα ἀ[κυ]ρολογοῦσιν. 
69  νῆες τῶν πλοίων διαφέρει. Δίδυμος (p. 321 Schmidt) ἐν Ἱστορικῷ φησιν οὕτως· ὅτι 
διαφέρουσιν αἱ νῆες τῶν πλοίων. αἱ μὲν γὰρ νη̣̣=ε/̣ς̣ εἰσι στρογγύλαι, αἱ δὲ στρατιώτιδες. Ἀριστοτέλης 
(fr. 614 R.) δέ φησιν ἐν τοῖς Δικαιώμασι τῶν πόλεων οὕτως· ‘ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ 
Μολοττός, αὐτὸν καταπεμψαμένων Ταραντίνων ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους πόλεμον, ἐξέπλευσε 







construction or use at sea, but because the Greek language has two different words for 
them. Different words means they must refer to different things. 
 Similarly, Philo pays attention to accentuation itself and often explains it by 
analogy: 
140. Póneron, as in sóloikon, and 
ponerón, as in noserón, are said to 
differ, just like móchtheros and 
mochtherós. For wickedness is ponerós 
with an oxytone, but a labour is 
póneros with a baritone accent. This is 
because the word demands wisely from 
necessity to be pronounced with an 
oxytone. For everything formed by 
adding the ending -ros has an oxytonic 
accent, such as kámatos, kamaterós; 
ólisthos, olistherós; méli, meliterós. 
And if pónos and móchthos are the 
originals, then ponerós and mochtherós 
should be oxytonic. If Attic speakers 
pronounce it with a baritone, it is not 
surprising, for they rejoice in the 
baritone. And so they say adelphéon; 
so they preserve some habit, and they 
display it.70  
 
Although once again there is no explicit admonition as to correct usage, one cannot 
help but read the grammatical explanation as a suggestion that one ought to follow 
these established rules of accentuation according to word formation and avoid the 
Attic variation.  
 This prescriptive element in Philo creates a stark contrast to the previous 
lexical authors. From what we have of Philitas’ Ataktoi Glossai, there is no evidence 
                                                 
70  πόνηρον, ὡς σόλοικον, καὶ πονηρόν, ὡς νοσερόν, διαφέρειν φασίν· ὁμοίως <μόχθηρος> καὶ 
μοχθηρός. πονηρὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὀξυτόν[ως] ὁ κακοήθης, βαρυτόνως δὲ ὁ ἐπίπονος· ὅτι δὲ ὀξυτονεῖν 
ὁ λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης σαφές. πᾶν γὰρ παρώνυμον εἰς ρος λῆγον σχηματιζόμενον τοῖς γένεσιν 
ὀξύτονόν ἐστιν, οἷον κάματος καματηρός, ὄλισθος ὀλισθηρός, μέλι μελιτηρός. εἰ καὶ πόνος καὶ μόχθος 
τὰ πρωτότυπα, πονηρὸς καὶ μοχθηρὸς ὀξυτόνως. εἰ δ’ Ἀττικοὶ βαρυτονοῦσιν, οὐ θαυμαστόν· χαίρουσι 







that he was concerned with correct usage. In fact, he appears to have been a proponent 
of non-standard language in general. Conversely, Philo tells us:  
12. Agein and pherein differ; for 
inspirited things are led (agein), but 
things without spirit are borne (pherein). 
And according to Homer, “here there is 
not such of mine, as the Achaeans would 
either bear (pheroien) or lead (agoien) 
away.” And again “They were leading 
the sheep, and brought glorious wine.”71 
 
Clearly, Homer felt there was a distinction between these words. Philitas, however, is 
notable for using ago in reference to an inanimate object.72 Here we have an 
interesting glimpse into the scholarly backdrop against which Philo was writing. 
Given some familiarity with the canon of post-classical authors who wrote lexica, it is 
plausible to suppose that he knew about Philitas, and perhaps a treatise on Philitas by 
Aristarchus. After consulting these sources, Philo then made a determination as to 
what was the correct usage of these terms. In the end, he chose to side with Homer 
and Aristarchus. Not only does this highlight key differences between Philitas and 
Philo, but also the evolving methodological differences between Philo and previous 
lexicographers. 
 Recalling the earlier discussion, we noted that Aristophanes’ aim was to 
provide clear and cogent explanations of words, both rare and common. His 
justifications for the definitions appear based primarily on classical literature, and at 
least as far as the fragments of the Lexeis show, he does not explore the idea of proper 
usage or even textual emendation. While Philo also cites classical authors, his 
                                                 
71  ἄγειν καὶ φέρειν διαφέρει. ἄγεται μὲν γὰρ τὰ ἔμψυχα· φέρεται δὲ τὰ ἄψυχα. καὶ Ὅμηρος (Il. v 
483 sq.)· ‘οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον, οἷον <κ’ ἠὲ> φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἤ κεν ἄγοιεν’.  
καὶ πάλιν (od. iv 622)· ‘οἱ δ’ ἦγον μὲν μῆλα, φέρον δ’ εὐήνορα οἶνον’. 
72 Spanoudakis, 197-8, speculates that this type of usage was one of the topics on which 







references are used to present both good and bad examples, albeit more often the 
latter than the former. This raises an important question: if even the original authors 
can be wrong about the correct usage of words, who or what is right according to 
Philo’s judgment? 
 
4. Philo’s Method 
 The answer lies in the way in which Philo thought about the mechanics of 
classical Greek. I propose that Philo created his distinctions according to the 
following hierarchy, from most to least important: 1) form/morphology, 2) classical 
usage, and 3) scholarly assessment. In other words, Philo was something of a 
structural purist; by his reasoning, distinction in form, even if the difference is very 
small, signals distinction in meaning. To him, this factor outweighs all others. One 
can only imagine how heretical he would have deemed a thesaurus.  
 This viewpoint clarifies the difference in some of Philo’s entries. The final one 
of the alpha section bears this out:  
36. Âthlos masculine and âthlon neuter 
differ. For the masculine indicates the 
contest, but the neuter indicates the 
prize. Homer says, “Indeed this 
awesome contest (aethlos) has come to 
an end,” and about the prizes, “After 
taking your prizes (aethlia),…”73 
 
Grammatically, these words come from the same root and differ only in their gender. 
Even their meanings are similar, but to Philo, because they differ in their gender, they 
are distinct, and therefore they must mean different things. Otherwise, why would the 
distinction exist?  
                                                 
73  ἆθλος ἀρσενικῶς καὶ ἆθλον οὐδετέρως διαφέρει. ἀρσενικῶς μὲν γὰρ τὸν ἀγῶνα δηλοῖ, 
οὐδετέρως δὲ τὸ ἔπαθλον·Ὅμ̣[ηρ]ος ‘ο[ὗτο]ς μὲν δὴ ἄεθλος ἀάατος ἐκτε<τέ>λεσται’ (Od. xxii 5), ἐπὶ 







 A further example of this type of entry comes in the epsilon section where a 
small distinction in usage creates a substantive difference in meaning: 
81. Euthus, euthu, and eutheos differ. 
For a straight rod is “euthus,” euthu to 
the gym is what you say, instead of 
“the gym down the straight” or “with a 
straight rod;” eutheos is used in place 
of an adverb of time. And so he is 
wrong who conflates these, as 
evidenced by Menander in the 
Dyskolos, “What do you mean? Did 
you go straight (euthus) there, knowing 
and asking for a freed slave?” … [And 
Aristophanes] says about the word, “It 
is necessary to use euthu for something 
straight, for instance, if it is a feminine 
noun, ‘the straight stick,’ or a 
masculine one, ‘the straight rod,’ and 
even if it is one we call neuter, ‘the 
straight post.’ The ancients also 
sometimes use euthu about a road 
heading into some place,…74 
 
Clearly, the guiding force behind Philo’s thinking is the fact that one of these is an 
adjective (euthus), while the other two are adverbs (euthu and eutheos). His criticism 
of Menander, then, is guided by the fact that the playwright uses an adjectival form 
where he ought instead to use an adverbial one. To Menander this was apparently a 
negligible difference, but not to Philo. Moreover, the invocation of Aristophanes to 
say that “it is necessary” to use a word in a certain way offers insight into the sort of 
tradition influencing Philo’s thinking. In contrast to Didymus who deferred to his 
                                                 
74  εὐθύς, εὐθὺ καὶ εὐθέως διαφέρει. εὐθὺς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κανών· εὐθὺ δὲ το<ῦ> γυμνασίου, 
ἀντὶ τοῦ κατ’ εὐθείαν τοῦ γυμνασίου ἢ εὐθεῖ τῷ κανόνι· τὸ δὲ εὐθέως ἀντὶ χρονικοῦ ἐπιρρήματος. ὁ 
οὖν ἐναλλάσσων ἁμαρτάνει, καθὰ καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Δυσκόλῳ (50.52) ‘τί φῄς; ἰδὼν ἐνταῦθα παῖδ’ 
ἐλευθέραν ἐρῶν ἀπῆλθες <εὐθύς>;’ καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης … φησὶ γοῦν κατὰ λέξιν· ‘δεῖ δὲ τὸ μὲν εὐθὺ 
λέγειν ἐπί τινος εὐθέος, οἷον, ἐὰν μὲν ᾖ θῆλυ τὸ ὄνομα, «εὐθεῖα ἡ βακτηρία», ἐὰν δὲ ἄρσεν, «εὐθὺς ὁ 
κανών», ἐὰν δὲ τὸ οὐδέτερον καλούμενον, «εὐθὺ τὸ ξύλον». οἱ δὲ ἀρχαῖοι ἐνίοτε τὸ εὐθὺ ἐτίθεσαν καὶ 







predecessors when determining correctness, Philo invokes them to demonstrate 
Menander’s incorrectness.  
 This focus on differentiation between words from the same root shows up 
again in entry 89: 
Theoros and theates differ. For a 
theoros is “one sent to the gods,” a 
theates is ‘a member of the audience” 
and “one of the spectators.” Euripides 
says in the Ion, “As a spectator 
(theates) or to seek an answer from 
the oracle?”75 which is to say a 
theoros… Those who say, “I must 
watch (theoresai) the contest,” are 
incorrect; it is proper to say 
“theasasthai...” And theasasthai, just 
as noted above, is used in reference to 
a spectacle. Theorein, they say, is 
nothing other than “to reflect upon.” 
And for this reason, not only those 
who are not sent for the sake of 
sacrifices, but also for the sake of 
communal offerings and worship, all 
of those are called theoroi. And a 
theoric payment is given to the 
Athenians not because of the 
spectacles, as Caecilius supposes, but 
because it was given during festivals 
for the sake of showing honour to the 
gods, making offerings, and 
experiencing delight.76 
 
There is no doubt that both theoros and theates come from the same root the-, but 
because the verbs on which they are based, theasasthai and theorein, have different 
                                                 
75 Euripides, Ion, 301 
76  θεωρὸς καὶ θεατὴς διαφέρει. ὁ μὲν γὰρ εἰς θεοὺς πεμπόμενος, θεωρός, θεατὴς δὲ ἀγώνων καὶ 
θεάτρων. Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἴωνι (301) ‘πότερον θεατὴς ἢ χάριν μαντευμάτων’,τουτέστι θεωρός… 
ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ λέγοντες «θεωρῆσαί με δεῖ τὸν ἀγῶνα», δέον εἰπεῖν «θεάσασθαι»… καὶ ἔστι τὸ 
θεάσασθαι, ὥσπερ πρόκειται, παρὰ τὴν θέαν· τὸ θεωρεῖν, φησίν, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὸ φροντίζειν. διὸ καὶ 
τοὺς οὐχὶ θυμάτων ἕνεκα πεμπομένους, τοῦ δὲ συνθῦσαι χάριν καὶ εὐσεβεῖν, πάντες ὀνομάζουσι 
<θεωρούς>· καὶ <τὸ> τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις διδόμενον θεωρικὸν οὐ διὰ τὰς θέας, ὡς Κεκίλιος ὑπέλαβεν, 







meanings, so too should the nouns derived from them, according to Philo. Small 
differences amount to important distinctions.  
 To return to an entry discussed above, when Philo comments on Homer’s 
usage, he says:  
164. Stratopedon differs from stratos. 
For they say that the stratopedon is 
“the place in which the stratos resides,” 
like a camp for the stratos (“army”); 
the stratos is “the number of those 
serving as soldiers.”… Homer 
conflates the place with the stratos, 
saying, “For the paths to the stratos are 
many”77 and perhaps in Attic fashion 
he calls the place in which the stratos 
resides the stratos, just as it is used in 
other instances. And so he says, “You 
will find him staying among the pigs 
(suessi).”78 For he says suessi to mean 
in the place of the pigs, where they 
stay…79 
 
For Philo, the distinction between these two words rests on the simple fact that one 
contains pedon (“ground”) and the other does not. The stratos is the army, so surely 
because stratopedon contains pedon, it by definition cannot refer to the soldiers as 
well and must point toward something to do with the land on which the military 
resides. Similarly, one cannot use stratopedon in place of stratos because the land 
where the army is camped is not the same as the army itself. It is not surprising, then, 
that Philo feels the need to comment on Homer’s usage. By Philo’s reckoning, when 
                                                 
77  Il. X 66 
78  Hom. Od. XIII 407 
79  στρατόπεδον στρατοῦ διαφέρει. στρατόπεδον μὲν γάρ φησιν ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός ἐστιν, 
οἷον στρατο<ῦ> πέδον· ὁ δὲ στρατὸς αὐτῶν τῶν στρατευομένων τὸ πλῆθος…ὁ δ’ Ὅμηρος συγχεῖ τὸν 
τόπον στρατὸν λέγων (Il. x 66)· ‘πολλαὶ γὰρ ἀνὰ στρατόν εἰσι κέλευθοι’ καὶ ἴσως Ἀττικῶς στρατὸν 
λέγει τὸν τόπον ἐν ᾧ ὁ στρατός, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις χρᾶται. φησὶ γοῦν (Hom. Od. xiii 407)· ‘δήεις τόν γε 







Homer uses the word for a military encampment to mean the army, he is making an 
error. 
 Entry 108 reveals a similar mode of thinking:  
Libanos (“frankincense tree”) and 
libanotos (“frankincense”) differ. For 
libanos signifies both the mountain and 
the plant, a libanotos is the burnt sap 
from the plant. Euripides conflates 
them in the reverse order, using libanos 
to describe what is burnt, as does 
Sophocles in the Tereus and Sappho, 
who calls a libanos libanotos.80 
 
Of these references, only one survives in an extant work, the one from Euripides 
(Bacchae 144): “And Bacchus, holding up a flame, as if from Syrian libanos...” 
Despite Philo’s admonition that it is not an entire tree being burned, only its resin, it is 
clear that Euripides is using the poetic license often afforded to a playwright. This 
usage recalls Homer’s extension of the meaning of “camp” to “army.” To Philo, 
however, this sort of freedom blurs meaning which is clearly unacceptable in his mind 
because the words differ in their structure, one employing only the stem liban- and the 
other libanot-, a compound of the same stem. For this reason, as far as Philo is 
concerned, they are not interchangeable.81   
 In entry 98, there is more evidence of Philo’s attention to suffixes: 
Italoi and Italiotai differ. For the 
Italoi are “those who have inhabited 
the land from the beginning,” but the 
Italiotai are “such people of the 
Greeks who inhabited the place after 
                                                 
80  λίβανος καὶ λιβανωτὸς διαφέρει. Λίβανος μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ὄρος <καὶ τὸ δένδρον>, λιβανωτὸς 
δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ δένδρου δάκρυον θυμιώμενον. Εὐριπίδης (Bacch. 144) συγχεῖ ἐναντίως ὡς ἐπὶ <τοῦ> 
θυμιᾶν τὸ λίβανον· καὶ Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Τηρεῖ (fr. 595a Radt)· καὶ Σαπφὼ (fr. 44, 30 L.—P. = 44, 30 
Voigt) ε̣)ν̣ δευτέρῳ λίβανον τὸ λιβανωτὸν λέγει. 
81  In fact, the -ot- affix often has the force of a perfect participle. It is not surprising that Philo 
would have understood libanotos as something which has been produced from a libanos, something 







these peoples.” The same is true of 
both the Sikels and the Sikeliots.82 
 
Philo, here, is making a similar kind of morphological distinction. Because the latter 
word contains the -tes masculine “gentile” suffixit cannot mean the same thing as the 
base adjective.83  
 The examples above show how Philo pays close attention the morphological 
elements of words and uses them to demonstrate distinctions in meaning; however, 
even when two words are morphologically the same, he also seeks to find distinctions, 
such as entry 29:  
Asphódelos and asphodelós differ among 
the Attics according to their oxytone. 
Tryphon, among others, says this in his 
second work on Attic prosody. For the 
one accented with a baritone is the plant 
among the ancients, but the one accented 
with the oxytone is the location in which 
the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon 
himself is somewhat inclined to write the 
place with the same accentuation as the 
plant. For often, he says, the 
surroundings are said with the same 
accent as what is being surrounded. For 
we also speak of garlic heads themselves 
and this has come to overlap with where 
they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the 
crocus plant itself and the place in which 
it grows.84 
 
Although Philo directs us to Tryphon to explain that places and products are 
interchanged, the tone is negative, leaving the sense that we ought not to be treating 
                                                 
82  Ἰταλοὶ καὶ Ἰταλιῶται διαφέρει. Ἰταλοὶ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν οἱ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὴν χώραν οἰκήσαντες, 
Ἰταλιῶται <δὲ> ὅσοι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπῴκησαν μετὰ ταῦτα. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν Σικελῶν καὶ 
Σικελιωτῶν. 
83 Herbet Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Oxford: Benediction Classics, 2014), 233. 
84  ἀσφόδελος καὶ ἀσφοδελὸς κατὰ τὸν ὀξὺν τόνον διαφέρει <παρὰ> τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς· ἄλλοι τε καὶ 
Τρύφων (fr. 14Vels.) ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ Ἀττικῆς προσῳδίας· τὸ βαρυτονούμενον γὰρ τὸ φυτὸν παρὰ 
τοῖς παλαι̣οῖς, [ὀ]ξυτονούμενον δὲ τὸν τόπον, ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀσφόδελος γίνεται· αὐτὸς δέ τι ὁ Τρύφων 
προκρίνει ὁμοτόνως τῷ φυτῷ καὶ τὸν τόπον ἐκφέρειν· πολλάκις <γάρ>, φησίν, τοῖς περιεχομένοις τὰ 
περιέχοντα ὁμοτόνως λέγεται. καὶ σκόροδα γὰρ αὐτὰ λέγομεν καὶ τὸν τόπον ἔνθα συμβέβηκε ταῦτα 







these words as interchangeable, because even when the distinction comes down to 
accent alone, the meanings of the words should be different merely on account of 
their form. Thus, the structure of words appears to be the highest criterion for Philo. 
 In some instances, however, form and morphology are insufficient to express 
the distinction. What is Philo to do when, say, two words are treated as 
interchangeable but come from entirely different roots, as in entry 76? 
Endon differs from eso. For endon is 
“in places,” eso is “towards a place.” 
For a child is inside, but I am going 
outside. And so he is wrong who says, 
“I am going inside (endon),” or “The 
child is outside (eso).” Sophocles 
confounds this difference and says in 
the Trachiniai, “Women, both those in 
(eso) the house, and those further 
beyond.” It is proper to say, “Women, 
those within (endon) the house.” And 
Euripides says in the Hercules, “the old 
man and old woman in (eso) the 
house,” instead of endon. And 
Euboulos the middle comic poet says in 
the Kalathephoroi, “You will find out 
in some way, it is a certain old man 
inside (eso),” but it is proper to say 
endon.85 
 
Here, it was useful to Philo to look at classical authorship. Morphologically, these 
words are entirely different, yet it appears to Philo they are being used incorrectly 
even among classical sources. However, just following the pattern used in other 
entries where the interchange of words is based on shared etymological elements 
could not work here, since the problem does not lie in the appearance of the words but 
                                                 
85  ἔνδον πρὸς τὸ ἔσω διαφέρει. ἔνδον μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἐν τόποις, ἔσω δὲ τὸ εἰς τόπον. ἔνδον μὲν γάρ 
ἐστιν ὁ παῖς, ἔσω δὲ εἰσέρχομαι. ἁμαρτάνει γοῦν ὁ λέγων «ἔνδον εἰσέρχομαι» ἢ «ἔσω ἐστὶν ὁ παῖς». 
Σοφοκλῆς τὴν δια[φο]ρὰν συγχεῖ· φησὶ γοῦν ἐν Τραχιν<ί>αις (202 sq.) ‘γυναῖκες, αἵ τ’ ἔσω στέγης αἴ 
τ’ ἐκτός’, δέον εἰπεῖν «γυναῖκες, αἵ τ’ ἔνδον στέγης». καὶ Εὐριπίδης ἐν Ἡρακλεῖ (cf. Heraclid. 584) 
‘γέροντα τὴν δ’ ἔσω γραῖαν δόμων’ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔνδον. καὶ Εὔβουλος ὁ τῆς μέσης κωμῳδίας ποιητὴς 








with a more fundamental error. To Philo, people fail to understand that “es-” should 
denote “outside” and “en-” should denote “inside.” As such, Philo resorted to citing 
classical authors to illustrate the incorrect usages and how to correct them. 
 This marks an important juncture where citations of classical authors become a 
critical, back-up tool for Philo. As in entry 76, sometimes he uses these to 
demonstrate errors, but at other times to underline correct usage as in entry 60: 
Epikouroi (“allies”) and boethoi 
(“mercenaries”) differ. For epikouroi 
are “those who are allies and rally for 
those under attack,” but boethoi are 
“the allies of those attacking.” Homer 
preserves this distinction throughout 
his poetry, for the epikouroi belong to 
the besieged Trojans and the boethoi 
are the allies of the Greeks. And so 
one cannot find in his work a named 
epikouros of the Greeks, only the 
Trojans. 
 
Epikouroi and boethoi share no etymological or morphological connection, so it falls 
to Homeric usage to explain how they are different.  
 Entry 134 shows an instance in which classical usage provides support for 
reasoning based on etymology: 
Orthros and proi differ. Orthros is 
“the time before sunrise,” according 
to which we become upright 
(orthos) after standing up from 
sleep, proi is the first part of the day 
according to Homer, “early (proi) at 
dawn,” and Hesiod says someone 
died “at the dawn (of his life) 
without ever marrying at all.”86 
 
                                                 
86  ὄρθρος καὶ πρωῒ διαφέρει. ὄρθρος μὲν ἡ πρὸ ἀνατολῆς ὥρα, καθ’ ἣν ἐξ ὕπνου ἀναστάντες 
ὄρθιοι γινόμεθα, πρωῒ δὲ τὸ πρῶτον καθὰ Ὅμηρος (Il. viii 530 xviii 277.303)· ‘πρωῒ δ’ ὑπηοῖοι’. καὶ 







Although these words do not share an etymological connection, it is clear that Philo 
connects the orth- stem in orthos and orthros with the Greek base that means 
“upright.” 87 Since orthros refers to early morning, Philo concludes that this alludes to 
the moment when people tend to stand upright for the first time in the day. 
 Classical usage is not the basis of Philo’s lexicography but in effect this 
backup plan, and this helps to explain why he feels justified in criticising some 
historical texts for their purported solecisms. To Philo, all words ought to be 
instantiations of higher linguistic principles. Unlike traditional lexicographers who 
look to usage for the rationale behind meaning, Philo treats usage and meaning as 
separate phenomena that may or may not coincide, and when they do not, meaning 
must prevail. 
 If it suits his purpose, scholarly opinion can serve as a helpful supplement to 
the distinction Philo is making, as is evident in some of the entries above. At other 
times, however, it is little more than a last resort to explain minute distinctions, as in 
161, in which he compares “staphulé with an oxytone (“ripe”) and staphúle with a 
baritone (“a plummet”).” This entry, the longest one surviving, is a grand exercise in 
understanding ancient scholarly opinion on accentuation. Morphologically, there is no 
distinction between these words; they differ only in accent. Since these words look all 
but identical, one can only imagine the number of ancient authors who struggled, by 
Philo’s understanding, to use these forms correctly. Yet because these two words 
differ in accent, they should be considered distinct, since meaning must follow form.  
 In sum, Philo’s deep concern with the structure and form of the Greek 
language as something independent of usage represents a striking departure from the 
                                                 








work and attitude of previous lexicographers. For this reason, the lexicon of 
Ammonius Grammaticus, whom one might call Philo’s spiritual successor, is also 
worth examining. It is important to recall that Ammonius is also our best source for 
the text of Philo whose original lexicon does not survive. We must never forget that 
we see Philo through Ammonius’ eyes.  
 
5. “Ammonius Grammaticus” 
 It is necessary first to clarify the identity of Ammonius, the epitomator of 
Philo. There are four potential candidates of varying viability: (1) there was an 
Ammonius of Alexandria, a pupil of Aristarchus; (2) a third-century CE Platonist 
Ammonius Saccas; (3) the Aristotelian commentator Ammonius, son of Hermeias, 
who lived in the sixth century CE; and (4) the fourth-century grammarian Ammonius 
Grammaticus. According to Dickey, only the fourth lived at the correct time to be the 
same Ammonius who epitomated Philo.88 This Ammonius fled to Constantinople 
from Alexandria and is cited in Socrates Scholasticus’ Ecclesiastical History.89 
 In addition to his epitome of Philo, Ammonius’ other text survives intact, De 
Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia (“On the Differences of Similar Words”). The 525 
individual entries in Ammonius’ lexicon bear a strong similarity to Philo’s surviving 
180 in that they focus on the different meanings of words, for instance, entry 30, 
“Allos and heteros differ. For heteros refers to two, but allos refers to more than two.” 
Often attention is given to words which look or sound alike. Entry 33, for example, 
says:  
Amygdalê and amygdále 
(“almond”) differ. For amygdalê 
                                                 
88 Dickey, Ancient Greek Scholarship, 95. 







with a circumflex is clearly the 
plant. Amygdále with an oxytone 
is the nut, for which reason 
Eupolis says in the Taxiarchoi, 
“Give to eat the Naxian fruit 
(amygdálas).” 
 
While Ammonius’ work is very close to Philo in its approach to lexicography, there 
are four significant differences. 
 First, there are a few entries in the epitome with variants in Ammonius’ text. 
For instance, Philo’s entry 16 compares aponoia and anoia, where Ammonius’ entry 
56 compares anoia and aphrosune with no mention of aponoia. Similarly, Philo 
compares andragathia and andreia (30), while Ammonius compares andragathema 
and andria (41). There are also entire entries in the epitome which do not correspond 
to anything in Ammonius. 90 
 Second, there are differences in the citations between the two texts. For 
instance, entry 16 in Ammonius, which corresponds to entry 20 in Philo, compares 
aito and aitoumai. However, where Philo attributes a quote to Menander’s Dyskolos, 
Ammonius assigns it to the same playwright’s Hymnis. In addition, entry 249 in 
Ammonius shows the use of different texts. Although both authors cite and attribute 
the same lines from Menander’s Hero and Sophocles’ Palamedes, Ammonius’ 
version includes a different line from Homer – Odyssey 2.356 as opposed to Odyssey 
11.223 in Philo 97 – and omits Philo’s references to Aeschylus. 
 This suggests that Ammonius is making deliberate changes in Philo’s entries, 
no doubt, emending, in some cases, what he sees as errors or inconsistencies. Of the 
entries from Philo which correspond with Ammonius, forty-one show there has been 
                                                 
90  Entries 3, 6, 10, 16, 23, 25, 30, 41, 53, 61, 79, 80, 85, 88, 93, 95, 119, 120, 125, 142, 144, 153, 








some degree of alteration made in the citations, either the inclusion of new ones or the 
replacement or exclusion of the ones in Philo. For instance, Philo 97 clearly contains a 
corrupt quotation from Aeschylus’ Choephoroi. The text in Philo reads hemin eos 
isthi (“Know our dawn”), a phrase that does not occur in the play. It is most likely a 
misreading of Choephoroi 147, hemin de pompos isthi (“Be my emissary”). Philo’s 
text appears to have conflated the imperative of oida (“know”) with the 
orthographically identical imperative of eimi (“be”). How the error crept into Philo’s 
text is not clear. It could have been in Philo’s original or the result of later 
miscopying. Regardless, Ammonius saw what was a clear error and omitted it.   
 Third, sixty-seven of the entries exhibit some sort of substantial change in the 
definition.91 Ammonius also alters and adds to Philo’s explanations. Philo 51 reads: 
Diploun and diplasion, it is said, 
differ. For diploun is said of things 
based on their size, and diplasion 
based on their number, for instance, 
“twice as many (diplasia) coins.” 
Diploun is said of things which are 
doubled, just as about clothes being 
folded, “the doubled (diploun) 
cloak,” not diplasion. For diplasion 
is used for the differences in size or 
number other than dimension, such 
as, “This is twice (diplasion) the size 
of that,” and, “This city is twice 
(diplasion) as far away as that one,” 
not “diploun.”92 
 
Ammonius 137, however, reorders the language and extends the explanation: 
                                                 
91  It is worth noting that there are another, minor differences not counted in these numbers. Some 
entries in the Ammonius text show either omission or inclusion of particles compared to entries in 
Philo, and some entries in the Ammonius text reverse the order of the given definitions from how they 
are laid out in the Philo text. Other differences include ones which can easily be explained by 
manuscript error, such as the transposition of words. 
92  διπλοῦν καὶ διπλάσιον, φησίν, διαφέρει. διπλοῦν μὲν γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μέγεθος, διπλάσιον δὲ τῶν 
κατὰ ἀριθμόν, οἷον «διπλάσια χρήματα». ἐπὶ τῶν διπλουμένων τὸ διπλοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν 
πτυσσομένων ἱματίων· «διπλοῦν οὖ̣ν τὸ ἱμάτιον», οὐκέτι «διπλάσιον». διπλάσιον γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων 
τῶν κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ πλῆθος διαφερόντων ἢ διάστημα, οἷον «διπλάσιον οὗτος ἔχει τούτου» καὶ 







Diploun and displasion differ. For 
diploun is used based on size, but 
diplasion is used based on number, 
just as triplasion and tetraplasion. 
For instance, “He has twice 
(diplasia) the number of coins.” 
Diploun is used of things which 
have been doubled, such as folded 
clothes, “a doubled-over (diploun) 
cloak,” not one twice the size 
(diplasion).  
 
In contrast to Philo, Ammonius includes the fact that diplasion functions on analogy 
with higher numbers, the same way we would say “triple” or “quadruple,” and trims 
down Philo’s contrasting examples.  
In some instances, Ammonius’ explanations offer greater clarity. Where Philo 
89 says, “Theorein, they say, is nothing other than ‘to reflect upon,’...” Ammonius 
226 reads, “Theorein, they say, is nothing other than to watch out for the gods, and 
that is ‘to reflect upon’...” Likewise, Ammonius 362, which reads largely the same as 
Philo 136, adds this comment to a quotation of Callimachus: “… which indeed is out 
of place. For he should have said houneka (“because of”), so that the sense would 
become, ‘not because of one song.’” 
 Fourth, and most importantly, Ammonius does not always retain the same 
criticisms as Philo. Ammonius 301 reads, “Libanos and libanotos differ. For a libanos 
is in common speech both the plant and the burnable resin, but a libanotos is only the 
resin.” However, as noted above, the original citation in Philo (108) goes on to 
criticize Euripides and other authors, whereas Ammonius offers no quotes or 
criticisms of classical usage. Similarly, Ammonius 448 reads: “Stratopedon and 
stratos differ. For the stratopedon is the place in which the army resides, but the 
stratos is the number of soldiers.” In the comparable entry, we saw that Philo then 







 Again, compare Philo 179 and Ammonius 485:  
Philo: Hyposchesis (promise) 
differs from epangelias 
(assurance). For one intending to 
give something worthwhile 
promises (hypischneitai), but one 
who intends to provide 
something without demand 
assures (epangelletai). And so it 
is necessary to take care (italics 
mine).93 
Ammonius: Hyposchesis and 
epangelia differ. For one who 
intends to give something 
worthwhile “promises” 
(hypischeitai), and one who 
intends to provide something 
without demand “assures” 
(epangelletai). 
 
The omission of Philo’s final admonition is telling. Ammonius is less prone to 
censure, which is not to say that his text is entirely free of prescriptive injunctions. In 
fact, of the eighteen entries in Philo which contain some form of cautionary statement, 
fifteen recur in Ammonius’ text, either intact or with only minor changes. Moreover, 
there are three remonstrations that occur in Ammonius with the same corrective tone 
and phraseology as Philo, but which lack a counterpart in Philo’s original: 64, 413, 
and 449.94 
 It is noteworthy, however, that the three criticisms which Philo makes and 
Ammonius omits are all directed at ancient authors (Euripides, Sophocles, Sappho, 
and Homer). By contrast, Ammonius’ three prescriptive entries not found in Philo are 
not explicitly directed at any ancient author’s word choice. This suggests that 
Ammonius is more reserved in his criticism of the ancient sources than Philo and is 
                                                 
93  ὑπόσχεσις ἐπαγγελίας διαφέρει. ὑπισχνεῖται μὲν γὰρ ὁ τὸ ἀξιωθὲν διδόναι 
θέλων· ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ ὁ δίχα παρακλήσεως παρέχειν τι βουλόμενος. χρὴ οὖν παρατηρεῖν. 







opting only to include those entries with which he agrees. This offers a glimpse into 
Ammonius’ larger purpose. While he is indeed following in Philo’s footsteps, at least 
inasmuch as he is writing his entries according to the same prescriptive, dual-entry 
contrastive formula, at the same time his tone is less severe as evidenced in his 









CHAPTER 3: Lexicography after Philo 
 
1. A Broad View of Later Greek Lexica 
 How are we to interpret Philo and Ammonius in the broader context of later 
Greek lexicography? To this end, let us take a brief look at later lexicographical 
authors, both those who immediately followed Philo and those who came much later. 
The pattern that emerges is a marked decline in the chastising tone that Philo 
embodies, and a rise in what is better described as simple glossaries in which ancient 
sources are typically viewed as authorities on language, essentially a return to 
Alexandrian standards.  
 First, the closest contemporary to Philo is Phrynichus Arabius who lived 
during the later second century CE. His Eclogues, which survive in their entirety, 
feature short statements quite clearly directed toward changing the reader’s usage of 
Greek, perhaps even more directly than Philo. For instance, he says in entry 6, 
“Mechris (“until”) and achris (“as far as”) with a sigma are improper. Say mechri and 
achri.” Furthermore, he says in entry 8, “Never say ‘he spits (emptuei) on me,’ but ‘he 
spits (kataptuei) at me,’ and ‘I spat (kateptusa) at him.’” Given his use of imperatives, 
Phrynichus appears even stronger in his censure than Philo, but there is an important 
distinction. While Phrynichus criticises modern solecisms and even some 
conventional Attic usages, it is not clear that he ever explicitly condemned the 
language of specific classical authors.95 
 Another author who lived after Philo but before Ammonius is Moeris, an 
Atticist lexicographer from the third century. His lexicon is similar to that of 
                                                 







Phrynichus in that the entries are relatively short and organized in contrasting pairs. 
For instance, entry 45 under alpha says, “The Attics say arrena (“masculine”); the 
Greeks say arsena (“masculine”).” Similarly, entry 7 under nu says, “The Attics say 
neaton (“outermost”); eschaton (“farthest”) (is used) in common speech.” The overall 
attitude of Moeris’ text seems to be descriptive. Unlike Philo and Phrynichus, his 
entries are structured so as to highlight differences between uniquely Attic 
expressions or words and more general Greek vocabulary. It is plausible that, as with 
many entries in Philo, there is an undertone of correction. The absence of explicit 
condemnations, however, reduces that possibility considerably, and we must assume 
Moeris deliberately chose not to follow Philo in this practice.  
 Like Ammonius’, the entries of both Moeris and Phrynichus are similar to 
Philo in disposition. All center around pairs of words and state how they differ in 
meaning. Philo, however, stands apart from the others in that he offers more 
explanation for the reasoning behind the differences he cites and a much greater 
willingness to criticize ancient sources. While Phrynichus and Moeris appear more 
focused on correcting the Greek of the living speakers in their time, Philo was intent 
on correcting the Greek of any speaker, past or present.  
 Despite its popularity in the second and third century, this dual-entry 
contrastive style of lexicon did not persist. Instead, in the fifth and sixth centuries, it 
was replaced by simpler glossaries. By the Byzantine period these had become the 
norm and are best represented by the important early medieval lexicographer 
Hesychius, who lived sometime around the fifth or sixth century CE. 
 Much of Hesychius’ importance comes from the fact that his lexicon is the 







gene (“clans”).96 The entries are structured not in paired groups but as straightforward 
glosses presented in both their dictionary and inflected forms. For instance, entry 63 
under alpha says, “abalis: a wretched olive tree,” and entry 22 under lambda reads, 
“labreusai: to speak boisterously and incessantly (cf. labros, “lip”).” Although not as 
abbreviated as Moeris’, the main distinction is that, even when Hesychius references 
classical authors, his lexical entries do not exhibit or even hint at any sort of 
corrective attitude. 
 It is important to be aware, however, that this lexicon has been “severely 
abridged” and “heavily interpolated” in its transmission.97 As a result, there is a 
possibility that these entries may have contained more detail, though one of the most 
interpolated sources, the lexicon of Cyrillus which also contain many brief entries, 
militates against that possibility.   
 Cyrillus’ lexicon was created around the same time as that of Hesychius, but 
has a different focus. It focuses the majority of its entries on biblical terms.98 
Stylistically, it closely follows Hesychius.For instance, the second entry under the 
heading beta-alpha-gamma reads, “bagion: large,” and the eighth entry under 
lambda-alpha-upsilon reads, “laura: a road, a single street.” Some entries contain 
more detail, such as the fifth entry under theta-epsilon-omega, “theoria: the act of 
perceiving sensations in the presence of those more divine. Properly, theoria is 
witnessing God, inasmuch as it is possible for a human to perceive Him.” In 
conjunction with Hesychius, these lexica suggest that the fifth century marks a turning 
point in the general style of lexica.  
                                                 
96 Dickey, Ancient Greek Scholarship, 88. 
97 Ibid. 89. 







 Lastly, the work of Photius, a ninth-century patriarch of Constantinople, 
represents the culmination of the glossary style of lexicon. Although some of the 
entries are rather long, the majority are quite short, some only one or two words in 
length, and few contain citations of literary authors. For instance, entry 21 under 
gamma says, “Galeos: a type of fish,” and entry 107 under delta reads, “Deile: the 
part of the day after midday.” What is most important here is that even in the longer 
entries there is little evidence of a corrective attitude.  
 This brief survey of the evolution of Greek lexica before and after Philo’s 
lifetime shows that during the second century there was a shift in lexicographical 
thinking toward prescriptive entries. Herennius Philo, the important figure among 
these corrective lexicographers, not only cautioned his readers about their use of 
words but also censured classical authors for what he saw as improper usage. But 
what are we to make of the fact that, despite the efforts of Philo and others, the 
corrective attitude in their lexica did not persist for long, even as the language 
continued to change? Plato phrased the question this way: 
Then, if I take something from 
reality, for instance what we now 
call a “man,” and I call this a 
“horse,” and that which we now 
call a “horse” a “man,” will the 
name for this be “man” for the 
public, but “horse” for me, and 
“man” for me and “horse” for the 
public?99 
 
In other words, can language be arbitrary, or is there an essential correctness to it? 
 
 
                                                 








 What is it that causes someone to pay such close attention to words and 
language that they feel the need to admonish perceived linguistic lapses even in past 
speakers? Indeed, what is it that motivates a person to codify and refine linguistic 
rules, even when meaning and understanding are not impeded? The preface to Samuel 
Johnson’s 1755 dictionary of the English language offers valuable insight into what 
goes on in the mind of those compelled to this extreme: 
Having therefore no assistance but from 
general grammar, I applied myself to the 
perusal of our writers; and noting 
whatever might be of use to ascertain or 
illustrate any word or phrase, 
accumulated in time the materials of a 
dictionary, which, by degrees, I reduced 
to method, establishing to myself, in the 
progress of the work, such rules as 
experience and analogy suggested to me; 
experience, which practice and 
observation were continually increasing; 
and analogy, which, though in some 
words obscure, was evident in others.100 
 
He later comments, “I have endeavoured to proceed with a scholar's reverence for 
antiquity, and a grammarian's regard to the genius of our tongue.” While we have no 
such preface from Philo, it is not hard to believe he shared a purist mentality with his 
distant scholarly descendant. 
 While on the surface Johnson’s project appears to be merely descriptive, it’s 
clear that his goal was to look through the corpus of English texts, as many as he had 
access to, and to render out comprehensible explanations of the meanings of the 
                                                 








words he found.  His “reverence for antiquity” hints at a prescriptive underpinning, 
inasmuch as one way to slow change in language is to keep older forms alive.   
 Philo, however, seems even more driven than Johnson towards some sort of 
perfectionism in language and does not share with him the sort of democratic, 
descriptive method of lexicography characteristic of Aristophanes of Byzantium. 
Indeed, all evidence suggests Philo took the much more extreme position that there is 
some sort of higher order directing language and that words must adhere to certain 
absolute and immutable rules. It is no concern of his, for example, that an adjective 
form is regularly used as an adverb, even if an ancient source treats it that way. The 
rules of the language mandate that adverbs must form and be used in a prescribed 
manner, and so wherever he finds a usage that does not accord with the rules, he 
brands it incorrect, no matter the authority of the user. 
 For this reason, Philo appears to have much more in common with the 
thinking of Noah Webster. In the 1828 preface to his dictionary, Webster says:  
I spent ten years in this comparison of 
radical words, and in forming a 
synopsis of the principal words in 
twenty languages, arranged in classes, 
under their primary elements or 
letters. The result has been to open 
what are to me new views of 
language, and to unfold what appear 
to be the genuine principles on which 
these languages are constructed.101  
 
In this regard, his mode of thinking is closer to Philo’s. Webster, for instance, pursues 
the principles which underlie the language, whereas Johnson employs the usage of 
words only in order to extrapolate their meaning. In this way, Webster provides a 
                                                 








valuable point of comparison in the broader lexicographic tradition because his 
preface suggests that Philo’s principle-based mode of thinking is not restricted to 
ancient scholarship. It is, rather, something that may drive the work of anyone who is 
inclined to put rules above practice. For this reason, perhaps, it is not surprising that 
few scholars are known to have emulated and reproduced Philo’s approach to 
lexicography in late antiquity. But he did find sympathizers elsewhere.   
 In 1926, H. W. Fowler published A Dictionary of Modern English Usage. It is 
a nearly 750-page volume of alphabetized comments concerning the use of different 
English words and phrases such as this one:  
Imaginary/Imaginative. The 
meanings of the two are quite 
distinct, and never interchangeable. 
That is imaginary which exists only 
in someone’s imagination; he, or his 
powers or products, is imaginative 
who is able or apt to form mental 
pictures. Any confusion between the 
two is due to the fact that there are 
things to which either can be 
applied, though in difference senses, 
and with some such things the 
distinction is not always apparent. 
The difference between an 
imaginary and an imaginative 
person is clear enough, but that 
between imaginary and imaginative 
distress is elusive; the begging 
impostor exploits the former; the 
latter is created and experienced...by 
the tragic or lyric poet.102 
 
Also this passage: 
Historic(al). The differentiation 
between the two forms has reached 
the stage at which it may fairly be 
said that the use of one in a sense 
now generally expressed by the 
                                                 







other is a definite backsliding. The 
ordinary word is historical; historic 
means memorable, or assured of a 
place in history; historical should 
not be substituted for it in that 
sense; the only other function 
retained by historic is in the 
grammarians’ technical terms 
historic tenses, moods, sequence, 
present, etc., in which it preserves 
the notion appropriate to the 
narration of the past of which it has 
been in general use robbed by 
historical.103  
 
Fowler’s resemblance to Philo in methodology is notable, especially in that two 
individuals so far apart in time were both driven to sanction use of their respective 
languages in this way and to this extent. The answer can be nothing so simple as 
labelling them grammarians gone mad. More likely, they were both highly educated 
scholars who came to understand a simple yet profound concept of language: words 
have a special relationship to reality. They are the unique mechanism by which people 
can relate the world to one another: as it is, as it seems, or even as it may never be but 
could.  
 This relation, however, operates correctly only when all the parties involved 
have a mutual understanding of the meaning, constituent elements, and proper 
function of words. In that case, the lexicographer’s task is to record this relationship 
in the form of a definition which identifies as precisely as possible what thing or 
action a word represents. Aristophanes of Byzantium made this connection through a 
careful examination of usage, past and present, domestic and foreign. The way in 
which a word was or had been employed dictated its meaning. 
                                                 







 For Philo and Ammonius  ̶  also Fowler and to some extent Webster as well  ̶  
this was not satisfactory. That a word was used to mean something which it should 
not by reason of its etymology or form was an error in need of correction, a violation 
of the “genuine principles” that govern, or should govern, language. From this radical 
perspective, there must be a strong logical connection between the form and the 
meaning of a word based on higher linguistic principles such as grammatical rules or 
etymology. These supersede established use or tradition or authority.  
 The work of later lexicographers shows that Philo’s attitude did not persist 
long in the tradition of ancient Greek scholarship. The fact is, the meanings of words 
change often without any obvious rationale. Thus, Philo’s was a noble but losing 
effort. How then to understand the impulse behind his attempt to bring the Greek 
language to heel and impose some sort of ideal state that recalls but is not slavishly 
addicted to the classical standard, to impose the rule of truths that prevail over time 
and tradition? Again, Samuel Johnson offers one solution: 
Among these unhappy mortals is 
the writer of dictionaries; whom 
mankind have considered, not as 
the pupil, but the slave of 
science, the pioneer of literature, 
doomed only to remove rubbish 
and clear obstructions from the 
paths of Learning and Genius, 
who press forward to conquest 
and glory, without bestowing a 
smile on the humble drudge that 
facilitates their progress. Every 
other authour may aspire to 
praise; the lexicographer can only 
hope to escape reproach and even 
this negative recompense has 
been yet granted to very few.104  
 
                                                 







Johnson’s lexicographer receives neither the grand accolades of an author nor the 
recognition of a scientist, but without the lexicographer’s labour of identifying and 
codifying language, all written work teeters on the brink of unintelligibility. He who 
chooses to write a dictionary attempts to render into a static and stable form 
something not only intangible, but mercurial and metamorphic. Although Philo’s 
work may seem to some to have “a certain amount of banality,” his intention is far 
from commonplace.105  
 There have always been those who ask “What’s the right way to say this 
word?” or “Am I using this phrase correctly?,” to whom the purists of the world are 
bold enough to rise and answer their questions. Herennius Philo sought to impose a 
certain level of logical consistency on ancient Greek, but it was a losing battle. One 
need only compare modern English to Fowler’s prescriptions to understand that even 
the most extensive and detailed commentaries on what purports to be correct usage 
can only do so much or be so effective. Despite Fowler’s caution that, “Between you 
& I is a piece of false grammar not sanctioned, like the contrary lapse It is me, even 
by colloquial usage,” everyone knows that denunciations of this sort have not 
conditioned English speakers to say “It is I,” at least not without projecting 
grandiosity and excessive propriety.106 To many ancients, Philo’s admonitions surely 
sounded the same.  
 The reason why the corrective attitude of Philo and others fell out of favour is 
that it was unable to overcome the changing tide of the language. If Fowler were alive 
today, he would, no doubt, lament how today’s English usage has ignored most of his 
rules. Consider one last passage from Philo:  
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87. Eis and estha (two ways of saying 
“you were”) are said to differ among 
the Athenians. For it is clear that estha 
expresses past time, while eis expresses 
potential. And so Hector says, 
“Deiphobos, truly before now you were 
(estha) far from my dearest friend.” 
And Menander says in the Kolax, “Sir, 
last year you were (estha) a corpse and 
a beggar, but now you are wealthy.” 
And about eis, again Menander says in 
the Pseuderakles, “Over wine, and not a 
small portion, nurse, speak, and you 
would become (eis) blameless, and you 
will always have a perpetual 16th of 
Boedromion.”107 And in general the 
word is used in this way about the 
future and follows our common usage, 
such as, “if you know, if you speak, if 
you are good.”108 And so he who says 
to someone, “You were (eis) rich,” will 
prove ignorant of the difference; for it 
was proper for him to say estha.109 
 
Clearly, ancient Greek speakers in the second century were apt to confuse these 
forms, and Philo was, no doubt, just as ineffective as Fowler in steering his peers back 
toward what he deemed proper usage. Indeed, in similar fashion, Fowler felt the need 
to spend nearly four pages discussing correct subjunctive usage, and no one today 
who understands English grammar is unaware that people regularly conflate the 
indicative and subjunctive of “to be” forms like “was” and “were” in common usage. 
                                                 
107  In the Athenian Lunar Calendar, the 16th of every month was considered one of the days on 
which the moon was full. According to Plutarch’s Life of Phocian, this was a day on which the 
Athenians celebrated the “great mysteries.” 
108  This is a reference to future more vivid conditions, such as “If you are good, you will be 
happy.” 
109  ἦις, ἦσθα, φησίν, διαφέρει παρὰ το[ῖς] Ἀττικοῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦσθα τὸν παρῳχημένον χρόνον 
δηλοῖ, τὸ δὲ ᾖς τὸν μέλλοντα. ὁ γοῦν Ἕκτωρ φησίν (Hom. Il. xxii 233)· ‘Δηΐφοβ’, ἦ μέν μοι τὸ πάρος 
πολὺ φίλτατος ἦσθα’. καὶ Μένανδρος ἐν Κόλακι (50 sq. Keo.—Th.2) ‘ἄνθρωπε, πέρυσι νεκρὸς ἦσθα 
καὶ πτωχός, νυν<ὶ> δὲ πλουτεῖς’. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ᾖς πάλιν Μένανδρος (fr. 454 Keo.—Th.2) ἐν Ψευδηρακλεῖ 
‘ὑπὲρ μὲν οἴνου μηδὲ γρύ, τίτθη, λέγε, ἂν τἆλλα δ’ ᾖς ἄμεμπτο[ς], ἕκτην ἐπὶ δέκα Βοηδρομιῶνος 
ἐνδελεχῶς ἕξεις ἀεί’. καὶ καθόλου πάντα οὕτως λέγεται ἐπὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ κατὰ τὴν <ἡμ>ετέραν 
συνήθειαν, οἷον «ἐὰν νοῇς· ἐὰν λαλῇς· ἐὰν ᾖς ἀγαθός». ὁ γοῦν λέγων πρός τινα «ᾖς ποτε πλούσιος», 







Although millennia apart, both Fowler and Philo were gripped by this same desire to 
preserve moribund distinctions in their languages, and while some may argue it is too 
soon to say that Fowler failed, it is clear that Philo did.  
 According to Samuel Johnson’s interpretation, lexicographers make language 
intelligible, yet their attachment to the past, to the word already written, 
simultaneously makes them obsolete and irrelevant. While the language continues to 
evolve under their feet, they spend their time forging a set of rules for a 
communication system that has already outpaced them. Such was Philo’s fate. To 
judge from what remains of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus, we can see that 
Philo expended considerable effort in analysing his native tongue and uncovering the 
deeper linguistic principles which inform it, yet the Greek from which he derived 
these principles was already dying in his day. It is true of every lexicographer that the 
connection between his rules and the language to which they are meant to pertain 
grows more and more strained over time, until eventually the tether that holds them 
together snaps. In Philo’s case, that tie was slender to start with and broke within a 
matter of centuries. 
 What, then, are we to make of Philo’s attempt to control language? It would be 
far too simplistic to identify his effort as a failure and move on, especially in light of 
modern parallels. Whether one chooses to look at the Académie française and its 
efforts to preserve the “purity” of the French language, or Katharevousa Greek, the 
eighteenth-century compromise between Demotic and Ancient Greek, questions of 
controlling language are never simple or insignificant. Instead, let us ask this 
question: was Herennius Philo’s failure born of a perverse and contagious obsession, 







 The thread common to Aristophanes, Johnson, Philo, and Webster is that they 
all understood that lexicography is fundamentally a boundary. The regularized and 
consistent entity which we call “correct language” lies within the cover of a 
dictionary, yet we know well that slang, colloquialisms, idioms (or idia, perhaps), and 
euphemisms are used widely, even though they live outside the dictionary. Does one 
speak “incorrectly” when describing the deceased as “pushing up daisies?” Philo’s 
restrictions on language proved too narrow to be tenable, but even so, it is difficult to 
imagine that Aristophanes, even with his lack of prescription, managed to fully 
encapsulate the Greek of his time. For while much information is contained in lexica, 
both ancient and modern, they are often limited by their inability to illuminate usages 
and meanings that lie outside of the self-imposed boundaries of their discipline.  
 It is the burden of those who wish to understand the meanings of words to 
realize that whatever meaning they grasp will never be completely and utterly 
comprehensive. Language, by its nature, is amorphous and variable, while any lexicon 
which endeavours to control it is static and fixed. It is incumbent upon us, then, to 
realize that the definitions we find in dictionaries are not necessarily absolute or 
objective. They exist as a consequence of human judgement, where, at some level, an 
individual made the decision to assert a particular meaning on a word and pronounce 
certain usages and definitions correct and others not, if only by implication. Although 
we often treat words as the ground floor of language, the starting point from which we 
determine meaning, it is equally important to recognize that our understanding of such 
is not based on some objective measure, but instead layers of human interpretation. 
Yet this was unsatisfactory for Herennius Philo. As a result of his erudition, 
Philo sought to refine language into a logically consistent entity, excluding the 







proved insufficient. The human variability of language prevailed. Despite Philo’s 
failure, later scholars nevertheless picked up a similar banner for their own languages, 
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APPENDIX A: Translation of De Diversis Verborum Significationibus 
 
De Diversis Verborum Significationibus 
Beginning of alpha 
 1. Athlon differs from epathlon; for an athlon is “the struggle itself”, but the 
epathlon is “the gift given to the one victorious.” 
 2. Astron differs from aster; for astron is “the form established from many 
stars,” but an aster is “the object itself shining.” 
 3. Astrologia differs from astronomia; for astronomia is “the apprehension of 
the stars,” but astrologia is “the knowledge which makes manifest the results from the 
motions of the stars.” 
 4. Arachne differs from arachnes; for the arachne is “the thinnest web of the 
animal,” that is to say of the spider, but the arachnes is the animal itself, pronounced 
as a masculine noun. 
 5. Aner differs from anthropos; for an aner is properly “one who is 
distinguished in some virtue,” but an anthropos is distinguished in nothing. 
 6. An anathēma differs from an anathĕma. For an anathēma, written with an 
eta, is “a thing both consecrated and set up in some divine place;” but an anathĕma, 
written with an epsilon, is “a thing having outrage and a curse.”  
 7. An ágroikos with a baritone and an agroîkos with a circumflex differ. For 
the ágroikos with a baritone is “one without a share of knowledge;” the agroîkos with 








 8. Apokeruktos and ekpoietos differ; for an apokeruktos is “the one who has 
been thrown from his home due to some wrong doing,” but an ekpoietos is “one given 
up for adoption.” 
 9. Apekéruxe and epekéruxe differ. For they say that kerûxai and apokerûxai 
are “to give away something for another because of a herald.” Menander says, 
“Agamemnon renounced her,”110 as if by a herald. But epikerûxai is “to promise to 
give money to the one who has gathered and killed one of the condemned.” 
 10. Aparaskeuos differs from aparaskeuastos. For the one who has the office 
of producer through himself would be called aparaskeuos, but one who has it from 
another would be called aparaskeuastos. For the arch-priest intending to give 
gladiators is aparaskeuos, but those gladiators are aparaskeuastoi. For the first attacks 
the appearance by another because it is passive, the other is free power. And so the 
one conflating these speaks incorrectly. 
 11. Halipaston differs from halispartos. For they say that the meat or fish 
sprinkled with salt is halipaston, but a space having been sown with salt is 
halispartos. For some of the ancient, hostile barbarians neighbouring the Greek lands 
sowed salt till the land was no longer able to bear fruit. For this reason, life calls those 
who have been terribly mistreated and have hard to cure bodies halispartoi. 
 12. Agein and pherein differ; for inspirited things are led (agein), but things 
without spirit are borne (pherein). And according to Homer, “here there is not such of 
mine, as the Achaeans would either bear (pheroien) or lead (agoien) away.”111 And 
again “They were leading the sheep, and brought glorious wine.”112 
                                                 
110  fr. 658 Kow.-Th. 
111  Il. V 483 







 13. Arrostos differs from arroston; for one who is unable to accomplish 
something according to their desires is arrostos, but one who is diseased is ill 
(arrostei). So Aristotle says. 
 14. Aûthis and aûthi without the sigma differ; for aûthis is “again” or “after 
these events,” but aûthi is also “the very thing here”. And so Callimachus says 
wrongly, “Right here (aûthi) I would strip this off, my weight,”113 instead of  “after 
these events.” And in the Hecale, “For this, father, release me, and you would receive 
safety right here (aûthi),”114 instead of “again” (palin). 
 15. Arrodein and orrodein are opposites of one another. For orrodein, written 
with an omicron, indicates “one who acts cautiously;” they think the word follows 
thus, the orros is said to be the place about the buttocks, they say also that it is the 
tauros; and because of this, this place of the birds is called the orropugion, not, as 
some are unaware, the orthopugion. It has been said truly, that orros is the place of 
the rump and is just as the orropugion. Those who are cautious are accustomed to 
drawing back their genitals when faced with something, often the irrational ones of 
the animals are accustomed to draw back the tail when one is cautions about 
something. And so sensibly, from the previous reasoning, orrodein is said in regard to 
being cautious. And Euripides introduces Perseus, saying “For I have never done 
wrong against those who have suffered terrible things, I myself fearing that I would 
suffer them.”115 and orrodein is such an action. But arrodein is the opposite, this is 
not “to be cautious,” but “to aim at and to have taken courage.” 
 16. Aponoia differs from anoia. Aponoia is “some rage and hateful 
arrogance;” but anoia, being a loss of the mind, is pitied rather than hated. 
                                                 
113  fr. 1,35 Pf. 
114  fr. 238,4 Pf. 







 17. Amunesthai and amunein differ. For amunesthai is “to punish those who 
have done wrong,” whereas amunein is “to come to the aid of others.” 
 18. Ateles and ateleston differ. For ateles is “something which has never been 
completed,” but ateleston is “something not able to be finished.” And so those who 
conflate these speak incorrectly. 
 19. Apologeisthai differs from apologizesthai. For apologizesthai is “to give a 
necessary speech of expenses,” and the mathematicians say “to account a single 
thing.” Apologeisthai is “to dismantle an accusation with a speech.” 
 20. Aito and aitoumai differ. For aito is said in regard to taking and not 
returning, but aitoumai is said in regard to needing to return. Menander expresses this 
difference in the Dyskolos: “For I am not asking for fire, nor asking to borrow 
dishes.”116 
 21. Aidos and aischune differ. For aidos is “reverence for each which one 
considers venerable,” but aiskune is “a shameful feeling about those actions which 
each person has done in error so that they not accomplish some action.” And one 
reveres (aidetai) their father, but feels shame (aischunetai) for becoming intoxicated. 
Aristoxenos the musician demonstrates this in his Laws of Teaching.117 Indeed, he 
says one must understand a distinction between aidos and aischune, because aidos 
concerns age, virtue, experience, and honour. For he who knows to show reverence 
towards the eminence of each of the items mentioned comes to be so disposed, not 
through some fault, but through revering and honouring the aforementioned 
eminences. Aischune is first an offence against every man in regard to customary 
disgraces and also against oneself, for one also shames themselves. 
                                                 
116  fr. 123 and 410 Koe.-Th. 







 22. Ámetos and ametós differ. For ámetos is “the season of summer,” but 
ametós is “the harvest,” as if one is harvesting fruit. 
 23. Apoleipei and ekballei differ. For a woman leaves (apoleipei) a man, but a 
man casts out (ekballei) a woman. 
 24. Antikru is “piercingly straightforward,” antikrus is “expressly visible.” 
 25. Amphi is “around,” amphis is “apart at either side.” 
 26. Aktai are “rocky places lying in the ocean,” thines are “beaches.” 
 27. Apophora and eisphora differ. For apophora is “the payment by the 
subjugated to their masters,” but eisphora is “the product given to the public by the 
citizens.” 
 28. Harpagé and harpáge differ among the Attics, as Tryphon says in his third 
work concerning Attic prosody.118 For if we speak it with an oxytone, as is 
convention, it will be clear that it is “a sudden and violent seizing.” If we should 
speak harpáge with a baritone, as with anágke, it is “that on which they take up water 
vessels from wells.” And we realize this from Menander, “A cup, a table, a downward 
hook, water,”119 and in the Hydroxous, “We do not know the child but the robbery 
which he himself prepared,”120 and Aristophanes says as much in the Niobos.121 
 29. Asphódelos and asphodelós differ among the Attics according to their 
oxytone. Tryphon, among others, says this in his second work on Attic prosody.122 
For the one accented with a baritone is the plant among the ancients, but the one 
accented with the oxytone is the location in which the asphodel plant arises. Tryphon 
himself is somewhat inclined to write the place with the same accentuation as the 
                                                 
118  fr. 12 Vels. 
119  fr. 657 Koe.-Th. 
120  fr. 180 Koe.-Th. 
121  fr. Nov. 







plant. For often, he says, the surroundings are said with the same accent as what is 
being surrounded. For we also speak of garlic heads themselves and this has come to 
overlap with where they are sold. Similarly, we confuse the crocus plant itself and the 
place in which it grows. 
 30. Andragathia differs from andreia. For andreia is “the commendable 
power of the body,” but andragathia has apparent mental virtue. 
 31. Hama and homou differ. For hama is an adverb of time, but homou is an 
adverb of place. And so Solon lived at the same time (hama) as Anacharsis the 
Scythian, if indeed he did flourish at that same time; however, they were not at the 
same place (homou). For they were not born in the same place, but one in Athens, the 
other in Scythia. Homer also shows this, “There then arose both (hama) a wailing and 
a shout of triumph from the men,”123 referring to the same time. And, “But when they 
were prepared, each with (hama) their generals…,”124 and, “Together (hama), they all 
raised their reins upon their horses.”125 And about place, he says, “I grew up together 
with (homou) her,”126 and again, “But together (homou) the planks of the ships and 
the bodies of the men…,” instead of saying in the same place. “Lord Agamemnon 
took his two sons in one chariot, together (homou) restraining the swift horses.”127 But 
there are times when Homer employs the word homou in a temporal sense, as 
Asklepiades says, “If indeed both war and plague together (homou) overpower the 
Achaeans…,”128  unless one then also says “now together” in the same place, such as 
“in Troy, war and plague are overpowering the Achaeans.” 
                                                 
123  Il. IV 450 sq. VIII 64 sq. 
124  Il. III 1 
125  Il. XXIII 362 
126  Od. XV 365 
127  Il. XI 126 sq. 







 32. Ainos and paroimia differ. For an ainos is “a mythic story brought out 
from unreasoning animals or plants meant for the advice of humans,” as Lucillius 
Tarraius says in his first work concerning fables.129  For instance, one may come from 
the unreasoning animals as with Archilochus, “This is a certain legend of men, 
wherein the fox and the eagle established a partnership…,”130 and so on. And again 
whenever he says, “I will tell a certain legend to you, Kerykide, sorrowing staff,”131 
and then puts forward, “The ape had been separated from the animals, alone at the far 
reaches. There, the wily fox, with his firm mind,  met him.”132 And Hesiod says, 
“Now I will tell a legend to the wise kings and others, this hawk addressed the 
nightingale with variegated neck, holding it high above in the clouds, caught in its 
talons…,”133  and one may come from plants, as in Callimachus, “Indeed, hear this 
legend. Once, on Mount Tmolus, the ancient Lydians say a struggle brought about a 
grove at an olive tree,”134 and so on. And an ainos is an unfolded proverb. A paroimia 
has the reference from the main point upon the worse, lacking the legend, and is 
received from something outside, such as, “Leave the bulls ever in the field,” and “Ivy 
after Anthesteria.” 
 33. Arti and artios differ. For arti is an adverb of time, but artios concerns a 
finished, completed work, just as Sappho says in error, “Completely (artios), Gold-
Sandalled Dawn…,”135 instead of the temporal arti. Among the Attics, artios is an 
indication of the current year, but arti the year on-going and about the time past. 
                                                 
129  fr. 1 Linn. 
130  fr. 174 W. 
131  fr. 185, 1-2 W. 
132  fr. 185, 3-6 W. 
133  Opp. 202 sqq. 
134  fr. 194, 6-8 Pf. 







 34. Âra and ára differ. For the one said with a circumflex is a dubitative 
conjunction, and we say it when we are in doubt, “How, then (âra), will he do the 
deed?” The one with the shortened accent is logical, “If it is day, there is light. But in 
fact it is day, so then (ára) there is light.” “If it is useful to do this, then (ára) we must 
do it.” 
 35. Aithe and ophelon differ. For the first expression does not show person, 
but ophelon does show person, such as “if only I, if only you, if only he.” And 
otherwise, aithe is an adverb, ophelon is both a verb and an adverb. 
 36. Âthlos masculine and âthlon neuter differ. For the masculine indicates the 
contest, but the neuter indicates the prize. Homer says, “Indeed this awesome contest 




Beginning of beta 
 37. Bomos, hestia, eschara, and megaron differ, and just as Ammonius 
Lamptreus says in his first work concerning offerings, “Bomoi are those which have 
entryways, an eschara is the one begetting a use for life on the earth, hestiai are 
extravagant, and a megaron is the enclosed hestia symbolizing the home.”138 “The 
hestia of noble Odysseus, at which I have arrived...”139 and he is both hearth-less and 
homeless. And the goddess is corporeal according to Hesiod, “Hestia and Demeter, 
and Gold-Sandalled Hera,...”140 And Neanthes Cyzikus says in his third work on the 
                                                 
136  Od. XXII 5 
137  Il. XXIII 736 
138  FgrH 361 F 1 a 
139  Hom. Od. XIV 159 XVII 156 XIX 304 XX 231 







city that bomoi are for the gods, escatai are for heroes. In Euripides, esxara appears 
instead of bomos in the Pleisthenes, “Offer the sheep upon the altars (escharais) of 
the gods,” as does Sophocles in the Chryse. 
 38. Basileus and koiranos differ. For basileus is “the one who inherits from his 
father the right to rule from birth,” but a koiranos is “one who accomplishes the due 
deed of a basileus,” such as Achilles was for his wrath, “So masterfully did he 
manage his army,”141  Moreover, a hegemon is the one conducting military 
arrangement, as Homer says, “Now when they were organized, each with their 
generals...’ 
 39.  Boulei and boule differ. This is because they say the word boulei 
indicatively, for instance, “You intend (boulei) to be angry with me,” but the word 
boule we understand subjunctively, “If you should intend (boule) it, we shall find a 
way.” Boulê written with a circumflex indicates “an idea.” 
 
Beginning of gamma 
 40. Gamelion and epithalamion differ. For an epithalamion is “a poem of 
marriage written at sea,” but a gamelion is “he who is not limited by time.” 
 41. Gamélia and gamelía differ. Gamélia are “the things accomplished on the 
day on which the wedding is completed,” or “the gifts given in the wedding.” 
Gamelía is “the registration and legal cause for marriage given to the community,” 
which they also call koureotis. And they use the phrase “wedding rites,” which those 
who register the youths and intend for them to marry make offerings to their fellow 
                                                 







people. The ceremony is carried out for Hera, Aphrodite, and the Wedding Graces; or 
it is an offering for the deities of the deme. 
 42. Geron, presbutes, and probebekos differ. Alexion says thus in his epitome 
of the collected works of Didymos, “From the works of Aristophanes concerning 
Man, it ranges from birth and growth until old age. For a brephos is ‘one newly born,’ 
a paidion is ‘one being nourished by a nurse,’ a paidarion is ‘one already walking and 
grasping speech,’ a paidiskos is ‘one in the clinging age,’ a pais is ‘the one able to go 
through daily education.’ Some call this clinging age pallax, others say boupais, or 
antipais, or mellephebos. After these, he is called ephebos. In Cyrene, they call the 
epheboi triakatios, and in Crete, they call them apodromoi because they do not yet 
take part in communal races; the Achaeans say kouros and agouros, as also do the 
Attics. After this, one is called meirakion or meirax, then neaniskos, and neanias, then 
aner mesos, then probebekos – which they also call homogeros –, then geron, then 
presbutes, and finally eschatogeros.”142 
 43. Gramma differs from stoicheion. For a stoicheion is “the very 
pronunciation and sound,” from which comes the representation in letters, the form, 
or the appearance, as in forming delta the triangle, the delta is with three lines, the 
omicron is formed as a circle. The stoicheion is complete, such as alpha, beta, 
gamma, and the remaining stoicheia. Stoicheia, however, are wrongly called 
grammata. Already the ancients were calling suggrammata grammata, and again, 
“But after Plato had picked up one gramma, the one about the soul,...”143 And we say 
in common speech, “He knows many grammata.” For he is not acquainted with the 24 
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letters, but many grammata. In this way, the one acquainted with many words is 
called grammatikos. 
 
Beginning of delta 
 44. Diskos and solos differ. For a diskos is “a pierced stone,” as Tryphon says 
in his fifth work on Hellenism, and a solos is “a solid lump of copper.” Homer also 
says, “the massive solos,”144 and elsewhere, “Take the diskos,”145 and then continues, 
“And the lithos sounded.”146 Pindar says, “Whenever with the stone diskoi,…”147 
 45. Dikastes and diaitetes differ. A dikastes is “the judge selected according to 
custom,” a diaitetes is “the one chosen according to the good collective fortune of 
coincidence.” Menander says in his Pais, “If some dikastes or diaitetes of the 
gods...”148 
 46. Diephthartai and diephthore differ. One has been sacked (diephthartai) by 
others, but has sacked (diephthore) another. Aristophanes says in the Horas, “You 
have violated (diephthoras) our oath,”149 and Menander says in the Adelphoi, “If this 
man has violated (diephthoros) the girl,”150 and Homer says, “Crazed man, you have 
defiled (diephthoras) your mind,”151 instead of saying that he had defiled 
(diephtharakas) his mind. 
                                                 
144  Il. XXIII 826 
145  Od. VIII 186 
146  Od. VIII 190 
147  Isthm. 1,25 
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 47. Dyspeithes differs from apeithes. For the first is “one who angrily accepts 
a believable definition,” but apeithes is “one who is knocked over and is unable to 
feel the pain.” 
 48. Demeter and Damater differ among Attic writers. Tryphon says, “For 
Demeter is the name of the goddess, Damater is the name of the miracle.”152 
 49. Douloi, oiketai, and therapontes differ among the ancients. Douloi is said 
of pleasures and all the people organized by a king, oiketai by a despotes, and 
therapontes of organized allies, by whom those who have arrived are served. 
 50. Diaboetos and epiboetos differ. For a diaboetos is “one recognized for his 
virtue,” but an epiboetos is “one who has a wretched reputation.” Anakreon in his 
second work says, “And you will make me a wretch (epiboeton) among my 
neighbours.”153 Some of the poets call this epiphatos and epirretos. 
 51. Diploun and diplasion, it is said, differ. For diploun is said of things based 
on their size, and diplasion based on their number, for instance, “twice as many 
(diplasia) coins.” Diploun is said of things which are doubled, just as about clothes 
being folded, “the doubled (diploun) cloak,” not diplasion. For diplasion is used for 
the differences in size or number other than dimension, such as, “This is twice 
(diplasion) the size of that,” and, “This city is twice (diplasion) as far away as that 
one,” not “diploun.” 
 52. Dichótomos with the baritone, as in antítupos, and dichotómos with the 
paroxytone, as in oikodómos, differ. For the first is passive, while the second is active. 
For when we pronounce it with the baritone, they are clearly “being split in two,” but 
when we pronounce it with a paroxytone accent, they “are splitting in two.” 
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 53. Doasato and doiasato differ, because doasato is equivalent to edoxe, but 
doiasato with the iota is equivalent to edistasen. 
 
Beginning of epsilon 
 54. Eleatros and edeatros differ. For an eleatros is “a cook at the eleoi” – eleoi 
are the cooking tables – but an edeatros is “the one who tastes the food.” 
 55. Epítimos and epitímios differ. For an epítimos is “an honoured citizen,” an 
epitímios is “one liable for punishment and reprehensible.” For this reason, we call 
epiplexis epitimesis and say, “Punish (epitimeson) him,” instead of epiplexon. 
 56. Endoxos and epidoxos differ. For the first is “one who is remarkable,” but 
epidoxos is “one who is expected.” 
 57. Hetairos and philos differ. For a philos is also a hetairos, but a hetairos is 
not always a philos. For a hetairos is also a colleague. For this reason, Homer says 
about the wind, “a good sail-swelling companion (hetairos).”154 
 58. Ekgonos and apogonos, they say, differ clearly. For an ekgonos is “a son,” 
but an apogonos is “a grandson or further descendent.” The rhetoricians misuse it 
when they say apogonos instead of huios. 
 59. Helkos, oteile, trauma, and plege differ. For a helkos is “a singular, 
lingering pain caused by an iron,” and can also be self-inflicted. It is also said about 
wounding the skin. Oteile is similarly “a beating from an iron.” A trauma is “a wound 
inflicted by an iron upon a sound body.” A plege is “a strike from a hand.” 
 60. Epikouroi and boethoi differ. For epikouroi are “those who are allies and 
rally for those under attack,” but boethoi are “the allies of those attacking.” Homer 
                                                 







preserves this distinction throughout his poetry, for the epikouroi belong to the 
besieged Trojans and the boethoi are the allies of the Greeks. And so one cannot find 
in his work a named epikouros of the Greeks, only the Trojans. 
 61. Herkos and herkion differ. A herkos is “a wall for cities,” a herkion is “a 
wall for homes.” 
 62. Heterophthalmos and monophthalmos differ. A heterophthalmos is “one 
who has been mutilated in one of the eyes through a puncture wound,” but a 
monophthalmos is “one who has always had only one eye,” like a Cyclops. 
 63. Eoikota differ from eikota. For eikota are believable, eoikota are 
appearances. 
 64. Euphyes and eumathes differ among the Attics. For they say euphyes as a 
joke, and eumathe for “one well disposed to learning.” 
 65. Exanepsioi and anepsioi differ. And this is because the Attics distinguish 
the nouns by the accent, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody, 
“exanépsioi is like amérimnoi, with a recessed accent,” he says, “different than the 
noun anepsiós with the oxytone.”155 
 66. Echthros differs from a polemios and a dusmenes. For an echthros is “one 
who was once a friend,” a polemios is “one advancing with arms against his 
neighbours,” and a dusmenes is “one who has maintained hatred for some long time 
against an ally and is unable to reconcile.” 
 67. Exeleutheros and apeleutheros differ. For they call “those born and given 
up to money-lenders due to a debt” exeleutheros, then apoluthentas, and then 
                                                 







eleutherothentas.  Commonly, they call those presently free from slavery 
apeleutheros, as Tryphon says in his fifth work on Hellenism.156 
 68. Epikedeion and threnos differ. For an epikedeion is the word for “burial,” 
threnos is the word for “such and such a time” as Tryphon says.157 Aristokles of 
Rhodes says to the contrary in his work on poetics, “Threnos is the song of misfortune 
which has a personal name, for it has lamentation along with praise of the departed. 
And so some in general say threnos, while others make a distinction between threnos 
and epikedeios, that the threnos is sung at the time of the misfortune in front of the 
tomb and after the burial, as well as on the anniversary of the funeral, and sung by the 
handmaids and those with them, but that the epikedeion constitutes praise of the 
deceased amidst some lamentation in verse.” 
 69. Emeio and emoio differ. For emeio is without an article, as Homer says, 
“Compose my word (emeio de suntheo muthon),” and emou is with an article. For 
instance, “my child (paida emou),” and, “of my child (tou emou paidos).” And Homer 
says, “Remember your father (patros soio),”158 instead of, “your father (tou sou 
patros).” 
 70. Erotan and punthanesthai differ. For punthanesthai is “to listen to what is 
said by someone exactly as reported,” the listener not making an erotesis; erotan, 
however, is “to intend to grasp some summary said in regard to an undertaken action.” 
And indeed Telemachus says to Nestor, “You have asked (eireai) from what place we 
are, and indeed I will tell you,”159 and Achilles says, “But come now, Patroclus, friend 
of Zeus, ask Nestor.”160 Because it is agreed that punthanesthai is plainly listening to 
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those speaking, and it is evident when Telemachus says, “Now indeed I am grown and 
I seek (punthanomai) advice listening to others,”161 and Odysseus says, “I inquired 
(punthanomen) about Ithaca.”162 According to the philosophers, erotesis is “an 
utterance seeking a guaranteed reply,” for example, “Yes, No, Uncertain, Certain, 
Unclear.” For these five replies are called “symbolic.” When, however, it is not so, we 
instead reply otherwise to these questions, for instance, “Is it daytime?” and so we 
will say, “It is daytime,” “It’s day,” or, “Yes it is.” Peusis is “a question to which is 
not possible to be answered in a guaranteed fashion,” for instance, “Where does 
Ariston live?” For you will say, “In this place.” Hektor says, “Where has Andromache 
gone?”163 and the handmaiden replies that, “She has gone to the great tower of 
Troy.”164 For this was not a guaranteed matter of “Yes” or “No.” According to an 
agreement on the preferred usage, the philosophers differ on this distinction, inquiring 
they talk about the difference. 
 71. Erotesis differs from peusis and anakrisis. For erotesis is “a brief answer,” 
peusis is “a report of a long deed,” anakrisis is “an examination of the two.” 
 72. Estai differs from genesetai. For estai refers to things now in reality, 
whereas genesetai refers to things about to chance upon creation, just as a young man 
will be (estai) old, but children will be born (genesetai) to the childless. 
 73. Heurein and heurasthai differ. For heurein is as in common speech, 
heurasthai is “to have found some such way.” Menander says in the Dyskolos, “I have 
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found the skill for this,”165 and Diphilos says in the Pyrrha, “My own gift, found from 
the gods.”166 
 74. Eran differs from pothein. Eran concerns those in one’s eyes, pothein 
concerns things far away. Homer distinguishes these,“As I love you (eramai) now and 
sweet longing seizes me,”167 Zeus says to Hera while she is present, but in absence, 
“But it was a longing (pothos) for you and your counsel...”168 Homer keenly preserves 
such differences. 
 75. Eumorphos differs from eueide. For eumorphos is “one who has a good 
figure,” such as one with a fair face, as we also say “configuring the face.” Eueides is 
“one who has a beautiful appearance,” such as the entire body. 
 76. Endon differs from eso. For endon is “in places,” eso is “towards a place.” 
For a child is inside, but I am going outside. And so he is wrong who says, “I am 
going inside (endon),” or “The child is outside (eso).” Sophocles confounds this 
difference and says in the Trachiniai, “Women, both those in (eso) the house, and 
those further beyond.”169 It is proper to say, “Women, those within (endon) the 
house.” And Euripides says in the Hercules, “the old man and old woman in (eso) the 
house,”170 instead of endon. And Euboulos the middle comic poet says in the 
Kalathephoroi, “You will find out in some way, it is a certain old man inside,”171 but 
it is proper to say endon. 
 77. Entauthoi, entautha, and enthade differ. For it is clear that entauthoi is the 
indication of “in a place,” entautha is both “in a place” and “toward a place;” enthade 
                                                 
165  489 
166  fr. 68 K. = IV 408 M. 
167  Il. XIV 328 
168  Od. XI 202 
169  202 sq. 
170  cf. Heraclid. 584 







is similar. Entha is the word for both “in a place” and “toward a place” and is used 
instead of the temporal adverb tote. Homer uses the word entauthoi, “Sit there 
(entauthoi) now, keeping away the pigs and dogs,”172 and Sophocles in the Electra 
says about entautha, “to send you there (entautha), into that place (entha) where you 
will not see the light of the sun.”173 For it has the indication of both “towards a place” 
and “in a place.” Similarly, Calypso says it to mean “from a place,” “Staying here 
(enthade) in this place you would hold this house with me.”174 And Hektor says, “But 
here the vultures will devour you.”175 For these uses indicate in a place. As regards 
toward a place, “Odysseus will go there (enthade) within this very year.”176 For the 
usage of entha as “in a place,” “There (entha) lies war-like Ajax, there lies 
Achilles,”177 and towards a place, “There (entha) we sailed, and some god guided 
us,”178 instead of the temporal adverb tote, and, “And here Pallas Athena gave to 
Diomedes, son of Tydeus...”179 
 78. Entha, however, can also mean tote, as in, “Then (entha) the rest of the 
Achaeans showed their approval,” and “place where,” as in “There (entha) we sailed, 
and some god guided us,” as well as “in this or that place,” as in, “There lies war-like 
Ajax, there lies Achilles, there lies Patroclus.” 
 79. Ex hosou and ex hotou differ. Ex hosou concerns time, ex hotou concerns 
someone or something. 
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 80. Epistrephes differs from eustraphes. For epistraphes is “one who is 
careful,” eustraphes is “one who is capable of handling changes.” 
 81. Euthus, euthu, and eutheos differ. For a straight rod is “euthus,” euthu is 
used of the path to the gymnasium, instead of “straight to” the gymnasium or “like a 
straight rod;” eutheos is used in place of an adverb of time. And so he is wrong who 
conflates these, as evidenced by Menander in the Dyskolos, “What do you mean? Did 
you go straight (euthus) there, knowing and asking for a freed slave?”180 And 
Aristophanes the Grammarian in his work On the Pinakes of Callimachus and On 
Antiphanes distinguishes this word. He says, however, that some of the ancients use 
euthus as a temporal adverb. And so he says about the word, “It is necessary to use 
euthu for something straight, for instance, if it is a feminine noun, ‘the straight stick,’ 
or a masculine one, ‘the straight rod,’ and even if it is one we call neuter, ‘the straight 
post.’ The ancients also sometimes use euthu about an extant road in some place, 
according to …, “I will go down that road as a free man,” and, “Since he knew this, 
he was acting up and down.” 
 82. Enthumema and enthumion differ. For an enthumema is “the form of an 
argument,” but an enthumion among the ancients is used in place of prostropaios; and 
so Antiphon says in the Phonikoi, “After he has died, we will have a great sorrow 
(enthumion).” 
 
Beginning of zeta 
 83. Zelos and zelotupia differ. For a zelotupia is “something which has arisen 
in hatred,” but zelos is “an imitation of something noble,” “A neighbor rivals (zeloi) 
                                                 







his neighbor.”181 Hera, however, is jealous (zelotupei) of Heracles, of Selene and 
Semele. 
 84. Zone and zonion differ. A zone is “a belt for men,” a zonion is one for 
women. 
 
Beginning of eta 
 85. Hesuchazein and sigan are said to differ. For hesuchizein is “to be still 
throughout the entire body,” sigan is “not to speak.” 
 86. Hemera differs from eos. For hemera is incorporeal, which Hesiod traces 
to Nyx, “And from Nyx were born Aither and Hemera.”182 And eos Hesiod attributes 
to Theia, “And Theia begot great Helios and bright Selene, and Eos, who shines upon 
everything on earth.”183 And about her corporeal form, Homer says, “However indeed 
gold-throned Dawn seized Cleitus.”184 
 87. Eis and estha are said to differ among the Athenians. For it is clear that 
estha expresses past time, while eis expresses potential. And so Hector says, 
“Deiphobos, truly before now you were far from my dearest friend.”185 And 
Menander says in the Kolax, “Sir, last year you were (estha) a corpse and a beggar, 
but now you are wealthy.”186 And about eis, again Menander says in the 
Pseuderakles, “Over wine, and not a small portion, nurse, speak, and you would 
become (eis) blameless, and you will always have a perpetual 16th of Boedromion.”187 
And in general the word is used in this way about the future and follows our common 
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usage, such as, “if you should know, if you should speak, if you should be good.” And 
so he who says to someone, “Should you ever be (eis) rich,” will prove ignorant of the 
difference; for it was proper for him to say estha. To the contrary, Homer employs e 
instead of ephe, “And the son of Cronos spoke and bowed his dark brow.”188 The 
verbs differ in this way: e is employed in regard to the appearance of a single third-
person, but ephe is about a third person, “I said, you said, that man said.” 
 88. Engua and enguato differ. Engua means “it was agreed to give,” enguato 
refers to the one receiving. Enguo means “I agree to give,” enguomai means “I take 
and guard in my hands.” For this reason, egcheirisai also means “to give.” For engue 
is “trust in safety and a safe and secure gift.” 
  
Beginning of theta 
 89. Theoros and theates differ. For a theoros is “one sent to the gods,” a 
theates is ‘a member of the audience” and “one of the spectators.” Euripides says in 
the Ion, “As a spectator (theates) or to seek an answer from the oracle?”189 which is to 
say a theoros. And Aeschylus says, “You speak, as one who has consulted the god 
(theoros) about such a deed.”190 Those who say, “I must watch (theoresai) the 
contest,” are incorrect; it is proper to say “theasasthai.” Lysimachides carefully 
demonstrates this in his work against Caecilius About the Attic Rhetoricians, and 
makes many comparisons. And theasasthai, just as noted above, is used in reference 
to a spectacle. Theorein, they say, is nothing other than “to reflect upon.” And for this 
reason, not only those who are not sent for the sake of sacrifices, but also for the sake 
of communal offerings and worship, all of those are called theoroi. And a theoric 
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payment is given to the Athenians not because of the spectacles, as Caecilius 
supposes, but because it was given during festivals for the sake of showing honour to 
the gods, making offerings, and experiencing delight. 
 90. Thuesthai differs from sphattesthai. This is because thuesthai concerns the 
worship of a god, and we say that thuesthai is “to form a prophecy through viscera.” 
Sphattesthai is to kill according to some cause. The first is said of the irrational, the 
second is said of a human. 
 91. Thebaioi and Thebageneis differ. Didymus says in his Memorandum of the 
Paianes of Pindar, “The Thebageneis send a tripod of gold from this place first to 
Ismenius. What, then, is the difference between the Thebageneis and the Thebaioi? 
Ephoros says, ‘And so these people were drawn up to Boeotia, the Thebans personally 
led the tribes neighbouring the Athenians after many years. And so the commingled 
people came from many places, and they were distributed across the land below 
Cithaeron and opposite Euboia; these people were called altogether Thebageneis, 
because they came to be among the other Boiotians through the Thebans.’191”192 
 92. Thuousi and thuontai differ. Those who kill the sacrificial animals thuousi, 
those who form prophecies through the viscera thuontai. 
 93. It is said that thuran and thuraian differ. For a thuraia is “that which is just 
before the doorway,” a thura is “the one present from the beginning,” as Menander 
says in the Parakatatheke.193 
 94. Thalamás, as in agathás, and thalámas, as in megálas, are said to differ, as 
Tryphon says in his second work on Attic Prosody.194 For if the accent is pronounced 
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with an oxytone, it will be clear that it refers to the place of the Dioscuri; if the accent 
is pronounced with a baritone, thalámas as in megálas, it signifies places of descent. 
 95. Thólos and tholós differ. A thólos is “the structure which they now call a 
kamara;” tholós is “the ink of the cuttle-fish.” 
 96. Thes, latris, amphipolos, and atmenos are said to differ. For a thes is “one 
who slaves away for money.” A latris is “one who has been captured in the midst of 
war and has been forced into slavery.” Amphipolos is the name for both male and 
female servants. An atmenos is not only a slave, but also a subjected free person. 
 
 
Beginning of iota 
 97. Isthi and ginou are said to differ. Homer uses isthi to mean ginoske, 
“Know (isth’) all these things, so that you may say them to your wife,”195 and the 
plural form iste as opposed to ginoskete. And Euripides says in the Chrysippus, “…,” 
and Menander, “Know (isthi) well,”196 and Sophocles in the Palamedes, “Know 
(isthi) this, singular youth,”197 instead of ginou. And Aeschylus says in the 
Choephoroi, “Know our dawn.”198 And in the Alope, “Do not know this, sullen 
man...you all know these facts of the law.”199 
 98. Italoi and Italiotai differ. For the italoi are “those who have inhabited the 
land from the beginning,” but the italiotai are “such people of the Greeks who 
inhabited the place after these peoples.” The same is true of both the Sikels and the 
Sikeliots. 
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 99. Isthmos and porthmos differ. For an isthmos is “a narrow passage of land 
with sea on both sides.” A porthmos is “a narrow area with different lands on either 
side.” 
 100. Hikesthai and aphikesthai differ as Heracleides says. For hikesthai is the 
opposite of elthein, aphikesthai is the opposite of epanelthein. Homer preserves this 
distinction, “Harpalion, who fighting the war followed his dear father to Troy, and did 
not return again to his fatherland,”200 and again, “He came to Marathon and the wide 
streets of Athens.”201 
 101. Ioudaioi and Idoumaioi differ as Ptolemaios says in his first work on 
Herod the King.202 For the Ioudaioi are those who were naturally there from the 
beginning; the Idoumaioi were not initially called Idoumaioi, but Phoenicians and 
Syrians; however, after they had been conquered by them and had been forced to be 
circumcised, to incorporate themselves into their race, and follow their own laws, they 
were called Idoumaioi. It is necessary to understand that some of the Greek historians, 
since they are ignorant of the divine texts, have an incorrect understanding of the 
Ioudaioi and the Idoumaioi. For those who come from Judah, the fourth son of Jacob, 
are called Ioudioi, and they are descended from the child of Abraham. The Idoumaioi 
descend from Esau, brother of Jacob, son of Isaac, who was the son of Abraham, and 
were born in Edom. 
 
Beginning of kappa 
 102. Kurios and despotes differ. For a kurios is “the husband of a wife and a 
father of sons,” a despotes is “one who commands those bought with silver.”  
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 103. Kuein and tiktein differ. For kuein is “to be pregnant,” and tiktein is “to 
be freed of pregnancy.” Euripides says in the Antiope, “Pregnant as I am, now I give 
birth.”203 
 104. Koman differs from gaurian. The ancients said that koman is “to pride 
oneself on something,” as Tryphon says. Now, koman is “to have long, aristocratic 
hair.” Simonides says in his first iamb, “And being unwashed, do not be proud, 
marvel neither at water nor your short beard, and do not place a garment of filth upon 
your skin.”204  
 105. One who is eneos was termed kophos among the ancients, as “one who 
does not make noise.” Homer says, “the soundless (kophoi) swell,”205 meaning 
apsophos. And the Pythia says, “And I will hear what is silent (kophou) and I will 
listen to what is unspoken,”206 since they are used in parallel. Now, however, kophos 
is “one who is hard of hearing.”  
 106. Aristoxenus says that kitharis and kithara differ in his work on 
instruments, explaining that a kitharis is a lyre and those who use it are kitharists, 
whom we call lyrodoi, and a kithara is what the kitharodoi play. Aischines also in his 
work Against Timarchus says in demonstration of this, “He had around himself both 
kitharistai and kitharodoi.”207 
 107. Katoikisis and katoikesis differ, as Apollonides the Nicaean says in his 
first work on falsified histories. And he says, “For katoikisis is ‘the act of foundation 
commenced upon others;’  katoikesis is when a certain group themselves found cities 
or take over a certain place. Such as how the Athenians have now settled around the 
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acropolis, but they colonized the Ionian people. And katoikesis concerns the act of 
settlement, while katoikisis is about the act of colonization.”  
 108. Libanos and libanotos differ. For libanos signifies both the mountain and 
the plant, a libanotos is the burnt sap from the plant. Euripides conflates them in the 
reverse order, using libanos to describe what is burnt, as does Sophocles in the Tereus 
and Sappho, who calls a libanos libanotos.  
 109. Lemma is profit with two mus, lema is andreia written with one mu. 
 110. Lachein and klerosasthai differ. For one person is selected (lachei) from 
everyone, but everyone casts a lot (klerountai). 
 111. Lechos and eune differ. For a lechos is “a bed,” but eune is “the bedding 
upon it.” And so Penelope says, “Cast upon it the bedding (eunen), the fleeces and 
cloaks.”208 She sends for the bedding, which consists of demnia and chlainai.  
 112. Luchnion and luchnouchos differ. For a luchnion is “the lampstand,” as 
Antiphanes says in the Aphrodite, a luchnouchos is “the light.” Menander says in the 
Nomothetis, “the light of another, the oil-flask of another.”209  
 
Beginning of lambda 
 113. Labein and dexasthai differ. For labein is “to take from one who is not 
giving.” Homer says, “But do you take the tasselled aegis in your hands...”210 
Dexasthai refers to an item being offered to someone, and it is formed on account of 
the right hand (dexian), and the right hand itself on account of the verb dexasthai, 
“She accepted (dekto) the beautiful goblet from fair-cheeked Themis.”211  
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Beginning of mu 
 114. How meirax and meirakion (“boy”) differ is said so in the difference 
between geron and presbutes. Now, according to another perspective, Aristophanes 
uses the noun, and so he says in the Gera, “Seeing a meirax pinching the testicles of 
the meirakion...”212 Recalling this drama and after adding to the verse, Didymus says 
that a meirax is female, and a meirakion is male. 
 115. Mneme and mneia differ. For if something is a mneme, this is not always 
a mneia. If something is a mneia, then this is clearly a mneme. A mneme is related to 
the impression of the soul, a mneia is an account told according to recollection. For 
one who is recalling also always has remembered, but one who has recalled has not 
always remembered. Still, a mneme is associated with recollection, and a mneia is a 
memory of one’s prior existence, and consequently, he is a fool who uses these terms 
in reverse.  
 116. Metabalein differs from metamorphousthai, alloiousthai, and 
heteroiousthai. A metabole is a common experience, since metabolai come about 
from opportunities, actions, and pleasures. And so, demonstrating the power of the 
word in the Orestes, Euripides says, “The change of all things is sweet.”213 
Metamorphosis is “an alteration of shape and a transformation of the body into 
another character.” Alloiosis is not only the alteration of character, as Homer says, 
“Now, stranger, you appear different to me than before,”214 but also another creation 
of earlier belief. Heteroiosis is like the change from one body into another, like Niobe 
into stone. 
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 117. Miseté with an oxytone and miséte with a baritone differ among the 
Attics, as Tryphon says in his second work on Attic prosody. For if we pronounce it 
with an oxytone, he says, it is clearly “the cause of hatred,” and if we pronounce it 
with a baritone, it is “a woman inclined towards intercourse.” Archilochus says that 
the difference between these words is preserved among the Dorians and the Ionians, 
“miséte woman.”  
 118. Mache and polemos differ. A mache is an activity in wars, a polemos is a 
time and preparation for mache.  
 119. Meria and meroi differ. For meria are “sacrifices to the gods,” meroi are 
offerings which are not so.  
 120. Mnatai and mnesteuetai differ. For a man courts (mnatai) a woman, but a 
woman seduces (mnesteuetai) a man. 
 
Beginning of nu 
 121. Nearon differs from neales and prosphatos. For the water just recently 
brought in is nearon; for “to draw off water” is implied by this word. Meat is 
prosphaton, for the word is built from the verb phemi, which is to make a sound, from 
which also comes the word phasganon. Something just recently captured is neales, for 
instance a fish; it can also be used of something just eaten with salt. 
 122. Nees differ from ploia. Didymus says as such in his History that nees 
differ from ploia.215 For nees are rounded and used to transport troops. Aristotle says 
in his Justification of Wars, “During that time, after the Tarentines had been sent 
                                                 







down to the war against the barbarians, Alexander the Molossian sailed away with 
fifteen ships (nees), and many ploia carrying horses and infantry.”216 
 123. Nereidas and Nereos thugateras are said to differ. Didymus says about 
the words in his Remembrance of the Victory of Bacchylides, “Moreover, there are 
those who say that the Nereidas differ from the Nereos thugateras, and believe that 
the thugateras are the very descendants of Doris, and call them more commonly than 
others Nereidas. They believe that the descendants are six in number, the others are 
more. Mnaseas says these things in this way in his works concerning Europa.”217 And 
so it is plausible to say that the Nereos thugateras are those more genuinely 
descended from one individual, Doris, than others, and that the Nereidas are their 
relatives.   
 124. Nun and nuni with an iota differ, as Heracleides says in his first work on 
general prosody. For the adverb is generally used in three contexts, inceptive, bygone, 
and impending, such as, “Now, the game has begun,” “Now the game will begin.” 
Nuni is used of in the one inceptive context.  
 125. Neaniskos and neanias differ. It has been discussed in the differentiation 
between geron and presbutes.  
 
Beginning of xi 
 126. Xoanon, bretas, and agalma differ. For a xoanon is “a smoothed likeness 
of wood or ivory,” a bretas is “a likeness of a human made of copper or wood,” and 
an agalma is prepared from Parian marble or some other stone. 
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Beginning of omicron 
 127. Oikeioi and oikees are said to differ. For oikeioi are “those who come as a 
result of marriage connections,” oikees are “all those who are members of the 
household, both those who are slaves and those who are free.” And so Hektor says, 
“And I will go to my home, so that I may see my household (oikeas),”218 “lest in 
Aegialeia, the thoughtful daughter of Adrastus groan and wake her household from 
their sleep,”219 and in the Odyssey, “who cared for his own life more than the slaves 
whom divine Odysseus had acquired.”220 
 128. Oiktos differs from oiktismos. For an oiktos is “pity for the one being 
pitied,” an oiktismos is “the expression of feeling pity.”  
 129. Ornitheutes differs from ornithoskopos. An ornitheutes is a hunter, an 
ornithoskopos is a prophet.  
 130. Houtos and houtosi differ. Houtosi with an iota is deictic only, but houtos 
is both deictic and anaphoric. It is deictic, as in, “This man, Diomedes, comes from 
the camp,”221 and anaphoric, as in, “This is the best of all, he who knows everything 
in himself.”222 The word itself is so, as it is in the case of touton and toutoni.  
 131. Ouden with a delta and outhen with a theta differ in extent. For ouden is 
said in general, for instance, whenever we say, “nothing in the cosmos is empty.” The 
one said with a theta is taken from oute and hen, for instance, “neither one nor two.” 
And so he who conflates these is incorrect. For this reason, they guide Zenodotus as 
he writes, “nothing (outhen) weaker,”223 with a theta. 
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 132. Oligon and mikron differ. For the first is used in regard to number, the 
second is used in regard to size. Nicias says in his Memorandum of Hecale about the 
line, “’few along the islet,’224 it is mikran use hypallagically. For oligon is about 
number, and mikron is used regarding size.” And Homer says indistinguishably, “a 
small table,”225 instead of mikran.  
 133. Hosia and hiera differ. For hosia are “the private items which one desires 
and is able to touch,” but hiera are “the items of the gods, which one is unable to 
touch.” Demosthenes says in his Against Timokrates, “And so he established this 
custom, through which he despoiled the gods of their divine (hieron) property, and the 
city of its holy items (hosion).”226 He said similarly, “Hosia are permitted for human 
use, as if they are accessible, hiera are not permitted, as if inaccessible.” 
 134. Orthros and proi differ. Orthros is “the time before sunrise,” according to 
which we become upright (orthos) after standing up from sleep, proi is the first part of 
the day according to Homer, “early (proi) at dawn,”227 and Hesiod says someone died 
“at the dawn (of his life) without ever marrying at all.”228 
 135. Opse and hespera differ. For hespera is “the state after the setting of the 
sun.” Opse is “the time long after the setting and generally much later.” Homer says, 
“When it was night (opse) he spoke.” 229 
 136. Houneka and heineka differ. For houneka indicates cause, heineka 
indicates the purpose. Homer says, “because (houneka) Chryses,”230 and, “for the sake 
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(heineka) of horrid Helen.”231 And so Callimachus incorrectly said, “not for the sake 
(heineka) of one song.”232 
 137. Ophlein and ophelein differ. For one pays a fine (ophlei) in court, but one 
is in debt (opheilei) as also we say. 
 138. Hoti and dioti differ. For dioti indicates the cause, and hoti sometimes 
indicates cause, and other times confirmation. We immediately know that (hoti) the 
moon has left, because (dioti) it is no longer there. 
 139. Oikade differs from eis oikon. For the first is “to proceed to one’s own 
house,” and so we say oikade, the second is “to proceed to another’s house,” eis 
oikon. 
 
Beginning of pi 
 140. Póneron, as in sóloikon, and ponerón, as in noserón, are said to differ, 
just like móchtheros and mochtherós. For wickedness is ponerós with an oxytone, but 
a labour is póneros with a baritone accent. This is because the word demands wisely 
from necessity to be pronounced with an oxytone. For everything formed by adding 
the ending -ros has an oxytonic accent, such as kámatos, kamaterós; ólisthos, 
olistherós; méli, meliterós. And if pónos and móchthos are the originals, then ponerós 
and mochtherós should be oxytonic. If the Attics pronounce it with a baritone, it is not 
surprising, for they rejoice in the baritone. And so they say adelphéon; so they 
preserve some habit, and they display it.  
 141. Presbeuesthai differs from presbeuein. Presbeuesthai is “to send the 
elders,” presbeuein is “to send for ambassadors.” 
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 142. Politai and patriotai differ. Politai are “those who have a share in the city 
itself,” patriotai are “those who are not in the city according to custom.”  
 143. Polis and astu differ. A polis is the structure, and astu is the preparation 
for a polis.  
 144. Frost is págetos, winter is pagetós.  
 145. Patria, patriokoi, and patroia differ. For patroia are “the items given 
from fathers to their sons,” patrikoi are “the friends or guests,” and patria are “the 
ethnicities of the fatherland.” 
 146. Proxenos, idioxenos, and doruxenos differ. For a proxenos concerns cities 
and ethnic groups, as Thucydides says.233 A xenos is “the guest of one other person,” 
and an idioxenos is the person himself. A doruxenos is “one who has become a friend 
in the course of war;” for after acquiring this and being deemed worthy of guesthood, 
one has been sent forth to the ransom taken from war. 
 147. Pelastes and penestes differ. The first is “one who seeks protection,” a 
penestes is “one who has been sold to others or enslaved during the course of war,” as 
the Helots were among the Laconians.  
 148. Plousios differs from aphneios and olbios. For one who has a great deal 
of property is plousios; one who gathers property from the year is aphneios; one who 
has perfect fortune is olbios. 
 149. Penes and ptochos differ. For penes comes from labouring and toiling 
throughout one’s life; a beggar is ptochos, which Homer supports from etymology, 
saying, “But cowering (ptosson) throughout the countryside he intends to fill his 
belly.”234  
                                                 
233  cf. e.g. II 29,1 







 150. Parechein and parechesthai differ. For one provides (parechei) dresses, 
drinking cups, and such, but displays (parechetai) their thoughts and opinions. 
 151. Pedalion and plethrion differ. For pedalion is said of boats, plethrion is 
said of rafts.  
 152. Paidiske and pais differ. For a paidiske is “a free girl among the Attics,” 
a pais is “a slave girl.” 
 153. Paidion, paidarion, paidiskos, and pais differ. For a paidion is “one being 
fed by a wet-nurse,” a paidarion is “one already walking around and grasping words,” 
a paidiskos is “one in the clinging age,” and a pais is “one who is able to go through 
daily education.”  
 154. Plethos and ochlos differ. For an ochlos is properly “a disturbance,” a 
plethos is “an organized group of people.” 
 155. Pei, poi, and pou differ.  For the first two mean “to a place,” the last one 
means “in a place.” And pei and poi do mean “to a place,” “Where (pei) has 
Andromache gone?”235 and, “Where (poi) are you fleeing?”236 And pou plainly 
indicates “in a place,” “Where (pou), now, as you came here did you leave 
Hector?”237 
 156. Polemikos and aichmetes differ. For “one who is acquainted with war” is 
polemikos, but an aichmetes is “one who skilfully uses weapons during the course of 
war.”  
 157. Pus, pei, po, and touto differ among the Dorians. For pus is clearly an 
indicator of “toward a place,” pei indicates “in a place,” and po indicates “from a 
place,” as does touto. Consequently, those who doricise and say, “where (pei) are you 
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going?” do so incorrectly, because pei indicates “in a place.” Sophron says, “for 
where (pei) is the asphalt?” and, “where (pei) are you, destruction?” instead of “where 
(pou) are you?” Whenever one intends to say “toward a place,” they say, for instance, 
“where (pus) are you going, into that corner?” as if to mean, “into the abyss.” 
 
Beginning of rho 
 158. Rhis and mukter differ. The rhis is “the descent from the space between 
the eyebrows to the lips,” mukter refers to the apertures of the rhis, through which it is 
possible to expel water.  
 159. Rhephanon and rhaphanon are said to differ among the Ionians and the 
Attics. For rephanon is that which we say, but rhaphanon is the cabbage.  
 160. Rhethron differs from rheuma. For a rhethron is “the place through 
which the rheuma is carried,” the rheuma is “the fluid itself.”  
 
Beginning of sigma 
 161. Ptolemaios of Ascalon distinguishes staphulé with an oxytone and 
staphúle with a baritone in his second work on prosody in the Odyssey. The baritone 
one, he says, is “the noun used among architects to refer to a falling lead weight,” the 
oxytonic one is used of fruit. And he says about the word in his second work on 
prosody in the Iliad, “’ their backs, equal to a plummet,’238 staphúle must be 
pronounced with a baritone as in Nióbe, for it is not the same as the fig (suke), 
because the first distinguishes fruits, the second does not.”239 Our Heraclides says that 
an error was made among Greek speakers as to the noun being oxytonic. Since none 
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of the nouns ending in -le are feminine, they no share in the neuter gender, since the 
upsilon is penultimate, it is pronounced with an oxytone, but all the neuter nouns 
longer than two syllables are accented with a baritone, not an oxytone, because the 
upsilon is a short vowel, as in krobúle, Kardamúle, Phaisúle – this one seems to be of 
those who had tended to Dionysus, whom Lycurgos “rushed down over holy Nysa,” – 
hedúle, kordúle; for this reason staphúle must be pronounced with a baritone. And so 
those who pronounce it with an oxytone say that neuter nouns ending in eta are 
pronounced oxytonically, apart from masculine baritone nouns ending in os; for if one 
pronounces masculine nouns with an oxytone, the feminine nouns will have a 
baritone, such as póthos/pothé, nómos/nomé, ônos/oné, tîmos/timé, phónos/phoné, “in 
painful slaughter,”240 and conversely Danaós/Danáe. “And so,” he says, “when 
stáphulos is in the masculine – for the son of Dionysus was called such –, the 
feminine staphulé must be pronounced oxytonically. Against these, one must reply, 
see kógchos/kóngche, phílos/phíle, mónos/móne, múlos/múle, and about the oxytonic 
pronunciation, kalós/kalé, sophós/sophé, and myriad other baritones have the same 
accent as baritones, and oxytones as oxytones; for this reason, it is not surprising that 
it has been pronounced based on the baritone Stáphulos and the feminine staphúlen is 
pronounced with a baritone.  
 Some, intending to come to the aid of common pronunciation and oxytonic 
pronunciation, say that as many as are indistinguishable from this accent and have the 
same indication, so many conflate the accent and will conflate the tone. Phílos and 
phíle, and xénos and xéne and the other preceding examples are indistinguishable, for 
which reason they are given the same accent, and are not distinct; accordingly 
                                                 







chólos/cholé, trópos/tropé, nómos/nomé, gónos/goné, dómos/domé, stróphos/strophé, 
póthos/pothé are– about this it has been said completely among others that there is a 
difference. And so if Stáphulos is a masculine noun, and there is a difference in 
meaning, staphulé – the fruit – is necessarily oxytonic. The reasoning is such, indeed 
the preceding observation from Heraclides is valid, in so far as he recommends 
making it baritone not only because of the construction following the noun, but also 
because it is longer than two syllables, but the former examples are disyllabic. And so 
the observation of Ptolemaius is acceptable, according to which the nouns do differ in 
their accents, he says, and in their definition.  
 162. Semeion differs from teras. A semeion is “a signal originating from the 
air,” a teras is “one in the earth.” 
 163. Summachein and epimachein differ. For summachein is “to be with 
others,” as Didymus says, “whether enemies are upon them or they march against 
others.” Epimachein is whenever they only protect those being attacked. Thucydides 
has doubted this, saying in his first work on the Corcyrians that the Athenians did not 
make a summachia, but an epimachia.241  
 164. Stratopedon differs from stratos. For they say that the stratopedon is “the 
place in which the stratos resides,” like a camp for the stratos; the stratos is “the 
number of those serving as soldiers.” Aeschylus says, “the army (stratos) has 
resigned, after abandoning the camp (stratopedon),”242 and Homer conflates the place 
with the stratos, saying, “For the paths to the stratos are many”243 and perhaps in 
Attic fashion he calls the place in which the stratos resides the stratos, just as it is 
used in other instances. And so he says, “You will find him staying among the pigs 
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(suessi).”244 For he says suessi to mean in the place of the pigs, where they stay, and 
specifies, “they are feeding by the rock of Corax.”245 Thucydides confuses the 
distinction of stratos to mean stratopedon, saying “the army (stratopedon) of the 
Corcyrians, as many as could hear, called out.”246 And Herodotus says, “The camp 
fought so through both sides.”247   
 165. Semeion and tekmerion differ. Antiphon says in his first work of Skill, 
“Things which have passed by are made believable by semeia, things which are yet to 
come by tekmeria.” 
 166. Seio and soio differ in their precise understanding. For soio is a declined 
pronoun, for instance, “Remember your father, Achilles, alike to the gods,”248 for it 
means of your father. Seio is without an article, “And for your own life, your sons 
must pay three times the ransom,”249 instead of sou, and not tou sou. And these are 
preserved in Homer. 
 167. Skomma differs from geloios, eutrapelismos, and gephurismos. For a 
skomma is “something said in disparagement of someone, as if a plot;” a geloion is 
something said by those listening in merriment, without any insult;” an eutrapelon is 
“something said beautifully without seriousness” – it has been described similar to a 
good turn of phrase – and gephurismos comes from “to write disparagements about 
someone with or without meter upon the bridges in Athens.”  
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 168. Stenai and stathenai differ. For stenai happens according to personal 
volition, stathenai happens from the volition of another, for instance, a human stands 
by himself, a statue is stood up by another.  
 169. Sisura and sisuris differ, as Eratosthenes demonstrates. For he says that a 
sisura is “a cover crafted from the hides of goats,” and a sisuris is “a shawl fashioned 
from fleece.” 
 
Beginning of tau 
 170. Turannoi and basileis differ. Turannoi was said in regard to basileis. 
Herodotus says regarding Croesus that he was “a turannos of the people,”250 and later, 
“after the death of Alyattes, he received the kingship.”251  
 171. Trochós with an oxytone, as in sophós, and tróchos with a baritone, as in 
nómos, differ among the Attics. For trochós they pronounce oxytonically just as we 
do, but they talk about tróchoi as the words for races. Euripides says in the Medea, 
“But see her children coming, after stopping their races (trochon).”252 For just as it 
goes légo/lógos, pléko/plókos, phéro/phóros, so too it goes trécho/tróchos. 
 172. Tríetes with a baritone and trietés with an oxytone differ according to 
Ptolemaius of Ascalon. For the first is accented baritonically concerning time 
throughout which, and Homer says, “And so for three years (tríetes) she hid with her 
trick.”253 If it should be pronounced with an oxytone, trietés, like euphués, it refers to 
the age of a small child.  
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 173. Teichos and teichion differ. A teichos surrounds cities, a teichion 
surrounds a farm.  
 174. Titthe and tithenos differ. And so Aristotle says in his work on children, 
“Titthai comes from the fact that they provide nourishment from the breast; tithenoi 
are those who undertake another task. And I say that they carry them about, play with 
them, clean them, wash them, lull them to sleep, and are involved in other tasks, such 
as all the care involved after weaning.”254 
 175. Timorein and timoreisthai differ. For timorein is “to come to the aide of 
those being wronged,” timoreisthai is “to punish the wrongdoer.” Achilles was the 
avenger (timoros) of Patroclus, and he punished (timoreitai) Hektor.  
 176. Touneka and houneka differ. For touneka is “for the sake of this,” and 
houneka is “because of this.” Callimachus makes an error in the Hecale, it is proper 
for him to say houneka, instead he says touneka.255  
 177. Tethe and tethis differ. For a tethe is “a grandmother,” a tethis is “the 
sister of the father or mother,” as Aristotle says. 256 
 
Beginning of upsilon 
 178. Hupopsia differs from huphorasis. For hupopsia is “the suspicion of 
some evil,” huphorasis is “the reputation given for something worse.” 
 179. Hyposchesis differs from epangelias. For one intending to give 
something worthwhile undertakes (hypischneitai), but one who intends to provide 
something without demand offers (epangelletai). And so it is necessary to take care.  
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Beginning of phi 
 180. Phlauron and phaulon differ. For a phlauron is “a small and 








APPENDIX B: Selections from Ammonius’ De Adfinium Vocabulorum Differentia 
 
64. Apo and para differ. For apo is used in regard to inanimate object, such as 
“from Athens.” Para is used of animate objects, for instance, “from Socrates.” Those 
who conflate these make an error or they make an exchange of the preposition, as 
even Homer does, “the two, going away from the ships.” (Odyssey, 14.28) 
 
413. Protos and proteros differ. For protos concerns many, but proteros 
concerns two. And a follower of the first (protos) is last, but a follower of the former 
(proteros) is the latter. And proteros is used in regard to the order of things, but protos 
in regard to their quality, such as whenever we say about glory in a skill that someone 
is first (protos echein), just as someone is outstanding. And so Plato says that in 
dividing governments, he considers one first (protos) and the other second. It is clear 
that one is considered the first, and the other following it. If one should say, “He came 
to Athens firstly (protos),” he is incorrect, for it is proper to say “proton.” 
 
449. Strateia with a long syllable refers to the act, but stratia with a short 
vowel is the number of the soldiers. The difference is often conflated in usage.  
 
